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Abstract
Discourse about the human world has, since Socrates, been structured around the
assumption that one view of a given matter is better than competing views, and that
argumentation, if carried out correctly and systematically, will favour the view which
has the preponderance of reasons and evidence on its side. If this supposition were
dropped, the nature of social scientific inquiry would change significantly.
For many commentators in the social sciences the ineliminable interpretative
dimension of social inquiry and the standpoint-bound character of interpretation lead
to the conclusion that we have to abandon any notion of objective truth in the social
sciences. The central question raised in this thesis is whether this abandonment is
inevitable or even plausible. Is it plausible to conflate objectivity and truth? Is
objectivity a possible characteristic of the individual researcher or a characteristic of
the scientific research process? Does the cultural environment of the researcher
impact on the validity of research findings? If science is a social phenomenon, are
scientific beliefs different from other beliefs? How do the interests of the individual
researcher or the formal organisation of scientific practice impact on the validity of
findings? What role does power play in the shaping of knowledge? These are the
questions that will be addressed in the following thesis.
The methodology of Max Weber serves as a point of departure and divergences
and similarities to the work of Weber are explored in the writings of Kuhn, the
Edinburgh School, Latour, Foucault, Habermas, as well as contemporary
postmodernist and feminist writers. The analysis of these various concepts and
approaches is not presented chronologically, but rather as an exposition of the
contributors of various commentators in the fields of both the sociology of science
and knowledge, and the philosophy of science.
iii
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Opsomming
Diskoers oor die menslike wêreld is, sedert Socrates, gestuktureer rondom die
aanname dat een siening van 'n gegewe saak beter is as mededingende sienings,
en dat argumentasie, indien korrek en sistematies uitgevoer, ten voordeel sal wees
van die siening wat gesteun word deur die oormaat van redes en bewyse. As ons
hierdie aanname sou laat vaar, sal die stand van sosiaal wetenskaplike ondersoek
ingrypend verander.
Vir menige kommentator in die sosiale wetenskappe lei die onafwendbare
interpretatiewe dimensie van maatskaplike ondersoek, en die standpunt-gebonde
aard van interpretasie, tot die gevolgtrekking dat ons enige opvatting van
objektiwiteit in die sosiale wetenskappe moet laat vaar. Die kernvraag in hierdie
tesis is of hierdie verskuiwing onvermydelik of selfs aanneemlik is. Is dit geldig om
objektiwiteit en waarheid saam te snoer? Is objektiwiteit 'n moontlike eienskap van
die individuele navorser, of 'n eienskap van die navorsingsproses? Watter impak het
die kulturele omgewing van die navorser op die geldigheid van die
navorsingsbevindinge? As wetenskap 'n sosiale fenomeen is, is wetenskaplike
oortuigings enigsins anders as ander oortuigings? Watter impak het die belange van
'n individuele navorser, of die formele organsiasie van wetenskaplike praktyk, op die
geldigheid van bevindings? Watter rol speel mag in die vorming en skepping van
kennis? Hierdie is die vrae wat aangespreek word in dié tesis.
Die metodologie van Max Weber dien as vertrekpunt, en ooreenkomste tot en
afwykings van die sienings van Weber word ondersoek in die werk van Kuhn, die
"Edinburgh School", Latour, Foucault, Habermas, sowel as kontemporêre
postmoderne en feministiese skrywers. Die analise van hierdie verskeie konsepte
en benaderings word nie kronologies aangebied nie, maar eerder as 'n uiteensetting
van die bydraes van verskeie kommentators op die gebied van die sosiologie van
die wetenskap en van kennis, sowel as die filosofie van wetenskap.
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Introduction
The idea of disinterested, neutral, objective analysis, which arguably goes back to
Plato, culminated in modern positivism, in the idea that science serves humanity by
communicating morally neutral, objective information to improve the human
condition. Under the influence of positivist thought, it was believed that statements
that reported direct observations could provide neutral data against which
theoretical explanations could be tested. Such statements, if true, were thought to
mirror or represent the way the world is, to reflect in an unmediated way what is the
case. The truth of such statements could be determined without recourse to
metaphysical or theoretical beliefs. This notion that we can gain direct and
immediate access to reality was famously coined by Derrida as "the metaphysics of
presence" (Turner, 1996:402). Under the influence of the development of the
methodology of natural sciences, objectivity was viewed as unproblematic, one
could simply observe whether what was asserted was in fact the case or not. Alan
Chalmers (see Mouton & Joubert (eds.), 1990: 40) refers to this as the "common-
sense view of science". Inherent to this view of science is what Mouton refers to as
the "naturalistic notion of objectivity", or as stated by Mouton, "the term naturalistic
refers to the fact that this ideal of objectivity originated in the natural sciences,
where the assumption that the distance between subject and object is desirable, is
perhaps less problematic", though "this assumption is less plausible when applied to
the social sciences" (Ibid. 40).
Rob Stones (1996: 1-39) argues that contemporary social theory has presented a
much richer and more sophisticated view of the social world than the one with which
modernist sociology worked. Stones contends that "this rich and complex social
ontology (what sorts of things the social world is made up of) has not, however,
been matched by a corresponding development in the sophistication of research
guidelines" (Ibid. 1). It is in this sphere of epistemology and methodology that "the
state of the art is trailing forlornly some way behind" (Ibid. 1).
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Though there is a long tradition of thought that has been suspicious of claims to
have direct and objective access to the real world, as stated by Stones, "its pre-
eminence only began to be significantly challenged in the late 1960s and 70s"
(Stones, 1996:15). In the second half of the century, in an era of increasing
multicultural cosmopolitanism, social theorists became conscious of not writing only
for their traditional (mostly Western) audiences, but for increasingly sophisticated
multi-cultural audiences. As stated by Thomas McCarthy, "the presence of this
critical audience places enormous pressure on traditional ideas of social-scientific
objectivity, which are closely linked to notions of intersubjective validation. The
community of researchers that now has to be convinced includes a much greater
variety of competent observers" (Hoy & McCarthy, 1994:86). The realities of writing
in this increasingly decentred and multicultural public sphere have heightened self-
consciousness about the assumptions that have historically structured social-
scientific disciplines.
Discourse about the human world has, since Socrates, been structured around the
assumption that one view of a given matter is better than competing views, and that
argumentation, if carried out correctly and systematically, will favour the view which
has the preponderance of reasons and evidence on its side. If this supposition were
dropped, the nature of social scientific inquiry would change significantly. Thomas
McCarthy writes, "we have gotten used to living with unresolved disagreements in
all the 'human sciences', where what Kuhn calls the 'preparadigmatic' stage seems
never to be superseded by 'normal science', as regularly happens in the natural
sciences. We even have plausible explanations of why this should be the case, and
they turn on the ineliminable interpretative dimension of social inquiry and the
standpoint-bound character of interpretation" (Ibid. 241). For many commentators in
the social sciences these same features lead to the conclusion that we have to
abandon any notion of objective truth about the human world. The central question
in the following thesis revolves around whether this abandonment is inevitable and
whether there are no alternatives.
2
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Inquiry in the social sciences has to do with phenomena and practices that are
always already interpreted, and hence the aim of this form of inquiry is at
interpretations of interpretations, or as Anthony Giddens famously coined it, the
"double hermeneutic". As all interpretations are from a given point of view, and
social reality gives rise to a multiplicity of points of view, one may well conclude that
no interpretation is ever final. If there is every reason to expect the conflict of
interpretations to be a permanent feature of social sciences research, is it still at all
plausible to postulate objectivity as a methodological criteria or even as an ideal? In
this regard the impact of postmodernist theory has been particularly pernicious, and
the challenge presented in such a radical way, that no secure grounds could be
claimed for comparative evaluation of research results. Despite this, research of the
sort that is being challenged thrives, even where the challenges would seem on
philosophical grounds to have been fatal. The beginning of an explanation for why
this is so perhaps lies in the separation of "abstracted empiricism" from "grand
theory" which C. Wright Mills critiqued some time ago.
The complex and diverse activities called "social science" have for a long time
attempted to formulate predictive general laws in the manner of naturalistic
knowledge. The critics of this approach have placed interpretation and meaning at
the centre of the social sciences, and emphasised the normative and moral
purposes of this endeavour, i.e. Robert Bellah's notion of sociology as moral inquiry
(see Seidman, 1994: 283-293). In the history of social science there have also
been numerous attempts to incorporate both of these orientations into one
theoretical and methodological framework. Such a mixture of causal explanation
and complex interpretation has perhaps been most persuasively attempted by Max
Weber, and more recently, Jurgen Habermas, who in the words of James Bohman,
"argued for this irreducible methodological complexity" (Bohman, 1991: 7).
Whereas the old logic of the social sciences sought idealised reconstructions, the
new logic argues for an indeterminate and open-ended complexity, and rejects the
"received view" in favour of tracing the actual practices of social scientists. As
3
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stated by Bohman, "the turn to history and to practices has placed the social
sciences at the centre of contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science"
(lbid.8).
The widespread rejection of the logical positivist view of social science in the 1960's
has led to the emergence of various antimodernist and post-modernist views that
stress the subjective aspects of social sciences practice. The main tenets of
modern social science, that reason is the main instrument of scientific progress, that
objectivity implies a value-neutral attitude, and that truth and certainty are the goals
of science, have been criticised and rejected (Mouton & Joubert, 1990: 1 & 2).
These critical viewpoints and frameworks, however, do not only lack a unifying
paradigm, but "the boundaries between different points of view are constantly
changing" (1990: 1). The post-modern condition has led to a fragmentation and
cross-borrowing of innumerable perspectives and orientations, and any attempt to
group them together, even under the term "postmodernist", poses the danger of
oversimplification.
Useful for the purposes of this introduction is the work of Mouton and Joubert, who
identify various current trends and issues in the methodology and philosophy of the
social or human sciences1. As stated by Mouton and Joubert; "It is not surprising,
that the large scale rejection of the logical positivist view of science in the sixties,
would lead to the emergence of views which tended to stress various aspects of the
'subjective', whether the historical (Kuhn) or the sociological (Edinburgh school) or
even the totally a-logical (Feyerabend's epistemological anarchism) variety" (Ibid. 2).
Thomas Kuhn's concept of "paradigms" raised serious doubts regarding the
rationality and objectivity of science, and led to the adoption of more pluralist and
relativist conceptions of science. The rationality/relativism debates of the 1970's
that were sparked by Peter Winch's work on cross-cultural understanding created a
new interest in the concepts of rationality and objectivity. This inconclusive debate
1 It is worth noting that the use of the term social or human sciences is already considered a choice
for or against the traditional methods of the social sciences.
4
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was followed by what Mouton and Joubert refer to as "discourse fever", wherein
Foucault's studies of historical discourses raised problems regarding the role of
power relations and ideology in the history of science. This interest in power and
ideology received a new impetus through the Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas
who has famously refused to reject the belief in reason and objectivity characteristic
of the modernist project. Each of the aforementioned components of this diversified
and fragmentary phase in the philosophy of social science will be addressed in this
thesis. The analysis of these various concepts and approaches is not presented
chronologically, but rather as an exposition of the contributions of various
commentators in the fields of both the sociology of science and knowledge, and the
philosophy of science. The methodology of Max Weber serves as a point of
departure and divergences and similarities to the work of Weber are explored in the
writings of Kuhn, the Edinburgh School, Latour, Foucault, Habermas, as well as
contemporary postmodernist and feminist writers.
For many commentators in the social sciences the ineliminable interpretative
dimension of social inquiry and the standpoint-bound character of interpretation lead
to the conclusion that we have to abandon any notion of objective truth in the social
sciences. The central question raised in this thesis is whether this abandonment is
inevitable or even plausible. Is it plausible to conflate objectivity and truth? Is
objectivity a possible characteristic of the individual researcher or a characteristic of
the scientific research process? Does the cultural environment of the researcher
impact on the validity of research findings? If science is a social phenomenon, are
scientific beliefs different from other beliefs? How do the interests of the individual
researcher or the formal organisation of scientific practice impact on the validity of
findings? What role does power play in the shaping of knowledge? These are the
questions that will be addressed in the thesis.
5
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The four chapters of the thesis are arranged as follows:
1. The first chapter is concerned with MaxWeber's position on the objectivity of the
social sciences, and his attempt to bridge the gap between those who believe
that the social sciences should attempt to follow the path of the natural sciences,
and those who argue that the study of people as social beings is entirely distinct
from other sciences. To this end an analysis is made of the key concepts in
Weber's methodology, and the relation between Weber's conception of
objectivity and the concepts 'verstehen', 'ideal-type', 'value-relevance' and value-
freedom' is explored.
2. The second chapter is concerned with the social construction of scientific
discourse. Contrary to the position adopted by Max Weber, the notion that
science is or can be protected against intrusion of external influences is
challenged by studies on the actual practice of science. The chapter traces
various conceptions of science and knowledge through the work of Thomas
Kuhn, the 'strong programme' in the sociology of science, the ethnographic
fieldwork of Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, and the notion of
knowledge/power in the work of Michel Foucault. Comparisons are drawn
between these varying contributions to the study of scientific knowledge, and
similarities and divergences are addressed.
3. The third chapter is concerned with the implications of postmodernist theorising
and the deconstruction of objectivity. Attention is paid to the implications of a
non-hierarchical conception of knowledge claims, specifically the methodological
implications of standpoint theory in which the notion of a divergence of
standpoints rooted in different experiences has become most developed.
4. The fourth and concluding chapter is concerned with the possibility of charting a
new course between the modern faith in the rational individual and the
dissolution of the rational subject in post-modern thought. A critical theory that
6
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recognises the political nature of scientific research, and takes the problems of
interpretation in research seriously, is proposed as a way to restore the
connection between the traditional methodology of social science and the
grounding of research in subject/subject epistemic relations and practical
reason.
7
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Chapter 1
Max Weber's key concepts and the problem of objectivity
In this chapter an analysis is made of the key concepts in Max Weber's
methodology by briefly looking at Weber's own formulations and claims, as well
as the contributions of various commentators on the meaning of the concepts
'verstehen', 'ideal-type', 'value-relevance' and 'value-freedom', and the relation
between these concepts and the notion of objectivity.
Introduction
The problems and questions raised by the connection between theory and
practice has repeatedly drawn the attention of philosophers and social scientists.
It has led to the debate with whose commencement the name of Max Weber is
particularly linked. It is a debate concerning the significance and possibility of
value-freedom in science, and persists to this day.
The central theme of the Enlightenment, the struggle between rationality
(science), and prejudice and dogmatism, gave rise to the notion that research
can only be valid and objective if all subjective variables, values and
preconceived assumptions were excluded from the process. The scientist must
allow the facts to speak for themselves (nominally), prior to being spoken. The
phenomenon of human subjectivity is treated on par with objects in the natural
world. The sociologist, as observer of social reality, provides knowledge that is
purely instrumental in form, knowledge which does not carry any logically given
implications for practical policy or the pursuit of values. Like the natural
sciences, sociology is neutral in respect to values (see Mouton in Mouton &
Joubert, 1990:40-42).
The 20th century version of this relationship between values and objectivity
8
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propounded by Max Weber, though more sophisticated in its explication, shares
the assumption that "non-epistemic value judgements" can be excluded from the
process of research (Ibid. 43). Weber's methodological writings form the classic
point of reference for problems of value-interpretations. When he discussed
these issues he was actually entering the later stages of a debate that had been
going on for twenty years, the now famous Methodenstreit, the battle of methods.
By way of introduction it should also be noted that German intellectual life, not
surprisingly, exercised a strong influence on the thought of Weber. One of the
primary influences which demands mention is the epistemology of Immanuel
Kant. Kant argued strongly that the external world, what he called the "thing in
itself", can essentially never be known, for we always perceive the world through
the screen of our subjective categories. Weber was a neo-Kantian, in the sense
that he believed that one never knows anything apart from the categories one
applies to it. This applies to history, social life, and the individual human actor.
The social scientist is always selecting particular patterns to concentrate upon,
and the patterns are framed by the categories of the observer's own analysis.
For Kant there are two sources of human knowledge; sensibility and
understanding - "Through the former objects are given to us; through the latter
they are thought" (Tarnas, 1991:341). It is only through the workings of the
understanding that sense experience comes to be ordered and classified into
experience of the objective world. But here the similarity between Kant and
Weber ends. For, in so far as the sociologist is concerned with knowledge in
particular and not beliefs in general (regardless of whether these are or are not
known to be true), he is not asking what knowledge essentially is. He is, rather,
asking what social conditions promote or inhibit the acquisition of what sorts of
knowledge (Turner (ed.), 1996:40-41).
Weber provided one possible solution to a well-known dilemma. If you are
passionately religious, for instance, and interested in religion as the object of
your research, you will be neither impartial nor objective; but if you regard
9
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religion, as in this example, as a mere web of superstitions, there is the danger
that you will never have a deep understandingof the religious life of men. Weber
finds a solution by drawing a distinction between questions and answers: one
must have a feeling for the importance of what men have experienced in order to
understand them, but one must detach oneself from one's personal concern if
one is to find a universally valid answer to a question which is inspired by a
passionate interest.
Yet the perplexing question is precisely what the nature of this detachment is.
This detachment, in the case of Weber, and hence the validity of research
findings (answers), is founded in the methodological procedures which are
applied after the research problem (question) has been formulated. This calls for
an analysis of the central concepts in Max Weber's methodology, and will be
conducted by briefly looking at Weber's formulations and the contributions of
various commentators on the debate on the meaning of his concept "verstehen",
and his use of the construct "ideal type".
Verstehen
Max Weber states that to "understand" action, we must "identify a concrete
'motive' or complex of motives 'reproducible in inner experience', a motive which
we can attribute the conduct in question with a degree of precision" (Weber,
1949: 52).
Verstehen, the first technique here, is Weber's method of interpreting subjective
meanings. This may be rendered into English as 'understanding', but many
commentators on Weber retain the German word or add an adjective to the
English one because there seems to be more involved in it than can be captured
by simple translation. At the most basic level to use Verstehen we must observe
a situation and ask why the people involved acted the way they did. But what is
the nature of this method of understanding, and what is the content of Weber's
10
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concept of subjective meaning? Also, how is this method of interpretation
applied? To begin with, it would seem that the central relation is between the
meanings of the individual actor, the way the individual acts, and the
circumstances in which he/she acts.
Both the supporters and the critics of Verstehen have seen it as a special
method of gaining knowledge that is peculiar to the human disciplines. They
have regarded it as essentially an intuitive mental process in which one tries to
reproduce another's thoughts and emotions in one's own mind through a shared
humanity and empathy. Since this process can never be a complete and reliable
one, for to be so one would have to become the other person, they have
stressed the essential incomprehensibility of other men or cultures committed to
values differing from our own. In an ultimate sense this is of course true, and
one could argue that we are all imprisoned in our own selfhood. In the case of
the social sciences, however, the interpreter presupposes a basis for judgement
that is shared by all actors.
L.M. Lachmann, in his book entitled "The legacy of Max Weber" (1970: 17-48),
proffers an interesting notion of Verstehen which is worth mentioning. Whereas
it has often been said that in propounding the method of Verstehen Weber was
defending the heritage of German idealism against the onslaught of positivism,
Lachmann argues that regardless of Weber's own attitude toward it, the
interpretation of human utterance is much older than German Idealism. The
whole hermeneutical tradition that goes back to Schleiermacher in the 1800's is
nothing new. Lachmann argues that we may say that it is a "natural" way of
rendering an intelligible account of human manifestations, as it is nothing less
than the traditional method of classical scholarship. In broad sketches his thesis
is that when people traditionally strove to understand a text they employed a
number of procedures aimed at the greatest possible understanding of what the
author wanted to say. If the text contained a generalisation such as a legal norm
or religious precept a decision had to be made as to what kind of concrete
11
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situation the text applied to. This textual interpretation, he argues, is the
prototype of Verstehen. Before the rise of natural science this was the method of
scholars, whether studying the Bible or translating Homer, and had little to do
with intuition. The writing of history became more than a recording of mere facts,
and historiography emerged as a scholarly discipline. It was only natural that
historians would adopt this method. Not content to merely study ancient
chronicles, they began to ask why people acted as they did. This pursuit for the
actor's purposes and goals was done by the same means as those by which
scholars for centuries attempted to ascertain what the author meant and
intended (1970: 17-48). States Lachmann:
"Once we have realised that the historical method of interpretation
applied to overt action instead of to texts, a method aiming at
identifying a human design, a 'meaning' behind observable events,
we shall have no difficulty in accepting that it can be just as well
applied to human interaction as to individual actors" (1970: 20).
This does, however, not clarify the question as to how the method of Verstehen
is to be put to the test of empirical verification.
In his analysis Dennis Wrong argues this objection, that Verstehen provides no
procedure for verification, "no way of determining whether the intuited meaning
of a action really corresponds to the actor's actual judgements and intentions"
(Wrong, 1970: 18). The argument: to provide an intelligible or meaningful
explanation of an action is at most to satisfy criteria of plausibility rather than
empirically verified truth. Verstehen, then, is no more than an indispensable aid
in developing hypotheses which can then be put to the test of empirical
verification in accordance with the most basic method of science. Wrong,
however, suggests that there is another way of viewing Verstehen. He states
that, "if Verstehen is seen as a directive to look for certain substantive aspects of
human conduct rather than as a special method of acquiring knowledge, it
appears in a somewhat different light" (Ibid. 19). In this view our understanding
of others is not limited to the scope of our own personal experience. Wrong
12
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states that though it may take a thief to catch a thief, a thief's goals are
nonetheless intelligible to an honest man (Ibid. 20). It is this ability which in
Weber's view gives social science an interpretative advantage over the methods
of the natural sciences.
This aspect of Weber's methodology is also raised by Coser, who argues that
when the objection is raised that rational knowledge of causal sequences may be
attained in the world of nature, but not in the unpredictable and irrational human
world, "Weber counters by turning the tables" (Coser, 1971: 220). The well-
known argument of Weber is that whereas knowledge of nature must always be
from the outside, by the observation of external courses and events and by
recording their uniformities, in the case of human action it is possible to impute
motives by interpreting men's actions and words (Ibid. 220). The interpretation
of human action in terms of motives can be constructed as a form of causal
explanation precisely because we are able to analyse it in terms of chains of
rationality, by linking 'motives' or 'purposes' to the 'means' whereby the actor
seeks to attain particular goals. In so far as conduct is rational, it is also highly
predictable. Following Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, Weber saw society as the
product of human wills. Individuals are not merely thinkers, they are also actors,
and the freer an individual's action, the less his act is conditioned or coerced, the
more clearly it can be analysed in terms of a means-ends rationality and hence
predicted by an observer. The operation of "free will", which is realised in a
given situation, thus presupposes that human behaviour conforms to ascertained
regularities (Giddens, 1974: 7).
Thus interpretative understanding is possible by penetrating the subjective
meanings which people themselves attach to their behaviour and that of others.
His or her answer may well amount to little more than a rationalisation of his real
motives, in which case we may well conclude that 'actions speak louder than
words' and construct an alternative interpretation of his conduct. The point,
however, is that we can constantly test our interpretation against the actor's own
13
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account, his conduct, and the situation in which he is acting. Dennis Wrong, in
this regard, states that this very real possibility of testing our interpretations is the
meaning of Weber's argument; "that interpretations which are 'meaningfully
adequate' must always be complemented by consideration of their 'causal
adequacy" (Wrong, 1970: 21).
Weber's idea, reduced to its simplest terms, is that in the realm of natural
phenomena we can understand only through the intermediatery of mathematical
propositions, observed constants, and previously established laws. In other
words, we must explain phenomena by propositions confirmed by experience in
order to have the feeling that we understand. As stated by Raymond Aron,
"Comprehension is therefore mediated; it occurs through the intermediatery of
concepts or relationships" (Aron, 1967: 191). In the case of human behaviour,
however, comprehension may be immediate. I understand why a driver stops in
front of a red light; I do not need to observe how often drivers regularly stop
before red lights in order to understand why they do it. But the notion of
immediate intelligibility is not unequivocal. It does not refer to some mysterious
faculty of intuition exterior to reason as in the case of, for instance, the aesthetic
idealism of Keats, Coleridge and Shelley. Nor is it immediate in the sense that
we can grasp at once, without previous investigation, the significance of the
behaviour of others, for the behaviour of others is not without ambiguity. A man
does not always know the motives for his actions, and an observer is still less
capable of guessing them intuitively. It requires prior investigation to distinguish
between what is probable and what is true.
When meanings are rational, we can often understand them by noticing how an
actor works toward his goals, particularly if his goals are similar to our own.
Moreover, empathy can often help us understand familiar non-rational motives
like pride, envy, jealousy, loyalty, love, etc. However, it is very difficult for us to
empathise with actors who display unfamiliar emotions, accept strange goals, or
respond to foreign traditions. To answer such questions, Weber introduced his
14
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ideal types.
"Such constructions make it possible to determine the typological
locus of a historical phenomenon. They enable us to see if, in
particular traits or in their total character, the phenomena
approximate one of our constructions: to determine the degree of
approximation of the historical phenomenon to the theoretically
constructed type. To this extent, the construction is merely a
technical aid which facilitates a more lucid arrangement and
terminology" (Weber in Gerth & Wright Mills (eds.), 1948: 324).
Even if we cannot understand individual meanings, he reasoned, we might be
able to judge these meanings as departures from some defined norm. If we
decide, for example, how a completely rational person would behave in a given
context, we can compare real behaviour with the rational ideal type. For Weber
the ideal type is the chief instrument of causal analysis in society, the
fundamental concept of all social sciences. Says Coser, "any interpretative
explanation must become a causal explanation if it is to reach the dignity of a
scientific proposition. Verstehen and causal explanation are correlative rather
than opposed principles of method in the social sciences" (1971: 221).
Consequently, our immediate and 'natural' intuitions of meaning only become
valid social knowledge when incorporated into theoretical structures which aim at
causal explanation. In the case of Weber the ideal type is the central construct
in such theoretical structures and one of the most distinctive forms of the
Verstehen mode of explanation.
The ideal type
"The kind of ideal-type model of social action which is constructed, for example,
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for the purposes of economic theory is ... 'unrealistic' insofar as it normally asks
how men would act if they were being ideally rational in pursuit of purely
economic goals. It does so in order (i) to be able to understand men's real
actions, shaped as they are, at least in part, by traditional restraints, emotional
impulses, errors and the influence of non-economic purposes and
considerations, to the extent that they are also affected by the rational pursuit of
economic goals; but also (ii) to facilitate knowledge of their real motives by
making use of this very deviation of the actual course of events from the ideal
type. An ideal-typical model of consistently mystical and other-worldly attitude to
life ... would have to proceed in exactly the same way. The more sharply and
clearly constructed the ideal types are - in other words the more unrealistic they
are in this sense - the better they perform their function, which is terminological
and classifactory as well as heuristic.
From the methodological point of view, the only choice is often between a
terminology which is not clear at all and one which is clear but unrealistic and
'ideal-typical'. In this situation, however, the latter sort of terminology is
scientifically preferable" (Weber in Gordon, 1991: 474).
Weber argued that no scientific system is ever capable of reproducing the infinite
diversity of particular phenomena in concrete reality, and that all science
involved selection and abstraction. The social scientist in particular is faced with
a dilemma in his choice of conceptual apparatus. Coser highlights this dilemma
by stating that if the social scientist selects very general concepts he is likely to
leave out what is most distinctive in the phenomena under study, whereas if he
particularises the phenomena he allows no room for comparison with related
phenomena (Ibid. 223). The ideal type was meant to provide a means of
overcoming this dilemma by serving as a measuring rod, "to ascertain similarities
as well as deviations in concrete cases. It provides the basic method for
comparative study" (Ibid. 223). Thus 'bureaucracy' is an ideal type, a form of
organisation in which everything is done according to the rules, everyone has a
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strict position, there is a clear chain of command, and so forth. Of course most
organisations never really fit this model, and Weber was quite aware of it. Hence
he pairs bureaucracy with another ideal type, 'patrimonialism', which is a form of
organisation that is distinctly unbureaucratic, centred around personal networks
and cliques. He can then characterise various states as fluctuating somewhere
between patrimonialism and bureaucracy, and show the conditions that pushes it
toward one end of the continuum or the other. History, in short, is an endless
flux of particulars that we can never grasp in entirety. By using the device of
ideal types, we can pin it down between certain fixed reference points.
Thomas Burger, in his analysis of the ideal type, states that there are three
interrelated aspects of ideal-typical constructs, which have to be taken into
account. These are their logical character, their content, and their function in
research. With regard to its logical character an ideal type is a concept of
several relatively similar and complex phenomena. Burger cites the example of
the concept "bureaucracy" which refers to a set of empirical phenomena, which
to varying extents exhibit bureaucratic features. The conceptual content is thus
abstracted from empirical reality in an exaggerated fashion. With regard to its
substantive content, an ideal type describes certain kinds of norms and plans
which individuals decide to follow, and the acts and thoughts, which follow from
these decisions. Finally as to its function in research, Burger states that an ideal
type is "a heuristic device for - among other things - finding out in a specific
empirical case by what motives the actors in question were guided in their
actions" (Burger, 1976: 155). All three these aspects must be taken into account
when answering the question, "what is an ideal type?"
What is clear is that ideal types do not provide a description of any set of
empirical phenomena but purely of phenomena, which would exist if people
always decided to act in certain ways in certain kinds of situations. They are
constructed in such a fashion that empirical occurrences similar to those in the
model are possible, and frequently empirical situations exist which exhibit the
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same features as the model. It is precisely such cases, which will suggest the
construction of the model. So, the ideal type solves two empirical research
problems. Firstly, it provides some way to sort out reality, to cut down the
number of things we must notice in complex situations. Secondly, it provides a
basis for judging whether certain important variables exist in the situation being
studied. Ideal types are consequently not merely ends in themselves, simple
labels for reality, but also form the variables we. use in empirical studies. The
main condition, however, is that such constructs should not be mistaken for
accurate descriptive or explanatory accounts of empirical phenomena. It would
seem that Weber managed to avoid this problem due to his acute awareness of
the precarious methodological status of ideal-typical constructions.
In all instances the ideal type is a means rather than an end, and the end of a
science of culture is always to understand subjective meanings; that is to
understand the meaning people have given to their existence. These subjective
meanings are by no means obvious. Aron (1967: 10), in his analysis, states that
"in Weber, the aim is always to understand life as it is lived, and his orientation of
scientific curiosity probably results from the relation that exists in Weber's
thought, and particularly in his epistemological theory, between knowledge and
action. One of the fundamental themes in Weberian thought is the antithesis
between Werturteil, or value judgement, and Wertbeziehung, or value reference"
(Ibid. 10). Men make value judgements, they create values, and historical
existence in Weber's view is essentially a creation and affirmation of values.
Hence sociology is a science of culture, a science of comprehension of the
existences that are defined by the creation of values. Weberian science is
defined, therefore, by an effort to understand and explain the values men have
believed in, and to explain and understand the works produced by men. How
can there be an objective science, one not distorted by our value judgements, of
the value-charged productions of men? This is the central question Weber
asked himself and tried to answer.
18
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Weber's concept of value-relevance
Without a desire to serve some personal, cultural, moral or political interests over
others, social scientists would have no reason to teach or write at all. "An
attitude of moral indifference", Weber writes, "has no connection with scientific
objectivity" (Weber, 1949: 60). Consequently values have to be implicated in the
practice of the social sciences for the practice to be rational and purposeful.
Though the social sciences should be value-free, they should also be value-
relevant. Weber writes:
"The problems of the empirical disciplines are, of course, to be
solved 'non-evaluatively'. They are not problems of evaluation.
But the problems of the social sciences are selected by the value-
relevance of the phenomena treated ....It should only be recalled
that the expression 'relevance to values' refers simply to the
philosophical interpretation of that specifically scientific 'interest'
which determines the selection of a given subject matter and the
problems of empirical analysis (Weber, 1949: 21).
It is due to the evaluative ideas with which he unconsciously
approaches his subject matter, that he has selected from an
absolute infinity a tiny portion with the study of which he concerns
himself....To be sure, without the investigator's evaluate ideas,
there would be no principle of selection of subject-matter and no
meaningful knowledge of the concrete reality. Just as without the
investigator's conviction regarding the significance of particular
cultural facts, every attempt to analyse concrete reality is
absolutely meaningless, so the direction of his personal belief, the
refraction of values in the prism of his mind, gives direction to his
work" (Ibid. 82).
The phrase "relevance to value" refers to the values that lead social scientists to
19
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
select one question or study over another. This value orientation appears to
operate at a number of levels, incorporating the values of a culture (what is
deemed significant or otherwise), the values of a discipline such as sociology,
and the values of the observer such as the sociologist. The implications of this
position would seem to include the view that what is conceived of as historical
reality changes as a result of cultural change, and that the field of knowledge in
social science changes with the historical process itself. Weber's position
departs radically from the form of positivism that views social science as a linear,
cumulative process. Far from a value orientation creating a subjective barrier to
the acquisition of valid historical knowledge, it is the indispensable means of
acquiring any historical knowledge at all. As Michael Root (1993:36) states,
"when Weber speaks of value-relevance, he has more in mind than
the values that rationalise the choice of question asked. He is also
thinking of the values that rationalise the way we ask the questions
and the direction we take in answering them".
Values, then, not only give scientific work direction, they also give it content.
Values do not only determine what social phenomena the social scientist
chooses to study, they also determine the point of view from which he studies
the phenomena, and hence how the phenomena is theorised and explained.
How then is the social scientist to achieve universally valid statements that are
not merely and purely subjective? Weber's answer seems to point in the
direction of the procedures of an empiricist research strategy, to which I will
return shortly. For now, suffice it to say that in Weber's view the social sciences
must not only be value-relevant, but also be value-free. Yet how is it possible for
studies in the social sciences to be both value-relevant and value-free?
Value-freedom
The psychological sense of 'subjective' is not usually what people have in mind
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when they say that social science is subjective and natural science is not. What
is usually meant is that the findings of the social sciences are biased and
unreliable. Closely connected to the claims about the subjectivity of the social
sciences in this sense is the thesis that values influence the findings of social
scientific inquiry. Using the adjective 'subjective' in the English rendering of
Verstehen is legitimate, but it does not mean that Weber opposed the notion that
the study of social phenomena can be objective. Though Weber presents a
complex position on the objectivity of the social sciences, he embraced the
criterion of objectivity without reserve and advocated it more passionately and at
greater length in his writings than many other major figures in the history of
social science. Freedom from value judgements - "Wertfreiheit" - was, for
Weber, not merely a possibility but a necessity in social science. In consonance
with this view, he embraced the fact-value dichotomy, which was a notable
feature of the reorientation of Western thought during the era of the
Enlightenment. (see Gordon, 1991: 489-493).
What, then, is the nature of the distinction between facts and values? As stated
by Scott Gordon, "Weber held, as David Hume had, that this is a logical
dichotomy, not an ontological one" (lbid.490). Reality is not divided into two
realms that cannot interact. Values can of course affect facts, and facts can
affect values in the real world, but, as stated by Scott Gordon, "a statement in the
subjunctive mood does not have the same semantic status as one in the
indicative mood" (Ibid. 490). To say that a person holds certain values is not
equivalent to saying that he is morally correct or incorrect in holding them. What
Weber insisted on is that social scientists should maintain a clear distinction
between is statements and ought statements.
Weber did not intend to exclude values from the subject matter of sociology. He
rejected psychological explanations of social phenomena because they construe
persons as responding more or less passively to stimuli, whereas, in his view,
the fundamental character of human behaviour is that it is consciously directed at
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the attainment of specific goals, and these goals reflect value judgements. The
values that men hold are consequently facts, which the sociologist must take into
account in his analysis of social phenomena. Weber also does not claim that the
sociologist makes no value judgements of his own. On the contrary, as we have
seen, he argues that in choosing topics for research, or in offering advice on
social policy, for that matter, the sociologist is unavoidably involved in making
value judgements. How then, one may ask, is social scientific objectivity
attained? For, an attitude of moral indifference has no connection with scientific
objectivity in Weber's view. Objectivity in sociology consists in making it plain
when one is speaking about facts and when one is resorting to value judgements
of one's own.
But differentiating between factual statements and moral statements is a great
deal easier to accomplish when one is speaking abstractly than when one is
engaged in the practical work of social science. How then is one to differentiate
between facts and values on the level of methodology? For if the instruments of
empirical investigation themselves contain value judgements, the results they
provide will necessarily be a mixture of facts and values that cannot be
disentangled. Weber's contention in this regard is that his methodology has no
normative implications, that it does not involve any commitment to a moral value
or political philosophy. The concept of ideal-types is held to be devoid of any
normative notion of 'ideal'.
The social scientist constructs the ideal-type for certain heuristic purposes. Their
usefulness is not assessed on the basis of their fit with the cultural phenomena
or empirical reality at hand, but on how well they make the significance of the
phenomena clear, and how well they make the causal relations between
phenomena clear. Like many other commentators on Weber, Michael Root
(1993:36) makes the point that by recommending that social scientists employ
ideal-types in their studies, Weber is opposing 'scientific naturalism'. The goal of
both natural and social science for the naturalist is to reduce reality to laws, and
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to construct concepts in such a manner that the concepts should be a mirror to
empirical reality. In this regard Weber does not fit the traditional conception of
the positivist mould. He offers an alternative epistemology for the social
sciences in which concepts are not merely convenient names which we coin in
order to mirror social phenomena, but analytical instruments, or heuristic tools,
for understanding the meaning of, and causal relations between, elements of
social life. For, as postulated previously in this text, Weber conceives
explanation as a matter of interpreting facts in light of their meaning for the
subjects of science rather than subsuming facts under general laws.
In Weber's view then, the ideal-type is chosen on the basis of a judgement of
value, but the choice is value-relevant, not value-laden. Ideal-types attain this
status of value-neutrality because their use is not a claim that individuals or
collectivities ought to conform to the type. They are concepts with which reality
is compared, not ideals by which reality is judged. As succinctly stated by
Weber: "There are ideal-types of brothels as well as religions" (1949: 69).
According to this old logic of the methodology of social science employed by
Weber, evaluations are to be excluded from scientific explanations for two
reasons: they introduce 'normative biases', and they cannot provide the basis for
empirical-causal explanations. The exclusion of evaluation leads Weber to the
seemingly anti-critical doctrine of the 'value-neutrality' of the social sciences. Yet
value-neutrality in Weber's sense does not exclude the possibility of social
criticism, but rather only limits its scope. In his methodological writings Weber
repeatedly criticises the positivists of his day, yet even if in accordance with his
methodology social scientists do not make value judgements, their analyses
must still be value-related. It is often not clear how this is possible without
making judgements.
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Concluding remarks
Weber, perhaps the most influential social scientist of the twentieth century,
presents a complex position on the objectivity of the social sciences. In many
ways, Weber can be seen to have attempted to bridge the gap between those
who believe that the social sciences should attempt to follow the path of the
natural sciences, and those who argue that the study of man as a social being is
entirely distinct from other sciences. Weber argued that in the case of the social
sciences the facts do not speak for themselves. As cultural beings studying
other cultural beings, the researcher poses other sorts of questions, and applies
other methodological devices, and hopes to gain different sorts of knowledge
from those characteristically associated with natural sciences. All knowledge of
concrete social reality, Weber says, is from particular points of view. Yet, though
the social scientist's values influence the construction of the conceptual scheme
that is used in an investigation, they need not influence its objectivity. On the
one hand, he insists upon the need to use theoretical concepts and empirical
evidence the way the natural scientists do, but he viewed the social scientist as
also engaged in a special process of Verstehen which supplements the mode of
explanation of the natural sciences, but does not replace it. As stated by W.G.
Runciman (see Gordon, 1991: 468), "Weber's position can be construed as a
self-conscious and deliberate attempt to have it both ways".
Weber was also willing to contemplate the possibility of conflicting explanations and
theories for a given phenomenon or historical case, yet he was passionately
concerned to establish sociology as an "objective" social science. He was
outspoken against the practice of using the university lecture hall as a platform for
political propaganda and was equally insistent that political commitments should not
be allowed to intrude in scientific research. At the same time Weber was aware that
attempts to understand an individual action or the historical development of a
society could only be partial and based upon an incomplete state of knowledge.
Because it is only possible to grasp the sum total of the causes of any unique event
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by replicating the whole of the reality which was antecedent to it, the social scientist
must choose those factors which are deemed the most important.
Whatever method or theory we use can only impose an order or reality, not exhaust
it. We can consequently not deduce reality from a set of a priori theories and
concepts, but must apply an empirical approach to sociological research.
Objectivity can be ensured only through the greatest possible precision in our
research method. Paradoxically, the choice of factors to be given attention will be
based on the theoretical problems of the social scientist, and hence the selection of
a research agenda is value-laden. This tension prevented Weber from aligning
himself wholly with either the nomothetic view (that the social sciences could simply
apply the methods of the natural sciences), or with the idealist tradition in German
philosophy (that the free will of individuals always introduced an element of
unpredictability). While accepting that nomothetic propositions might be possible in
sociology, they could never constitute a complete account of human agency. This
called for a special approach to human behaviour; one that recognises that because
people possess a free will, they can choose the goals they wish to pursue and
social science cannot specify in advance what these goals will be.
Causal explanations will be incomplete unless we take this characteristic of goal-
directness or value relevance into account. That is why general laws or nomothetic
explanations in the social sciences will be incomplete. On the other hand, Weber
did not agree with the idealists that the hallmark of the freedom of the human will is
the unpredictability and irrationality in our behaviour. On the contrary, our actions
have the greatest freedom when they are simultaneously at their most predictable,
that is, when they are the result of calculated rational choice. We are of course
under no compulsion to share this assumption. As stated by Ira Cohen (see Turner,
1996: 114)
"more recent theorists of action, especially John Dewey and Anthony
Giddens, virtually stand Weber's definition of action on its head by
proposing that taken-for-granted forms of conduct provide a basis for
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many ordinary forms of action, while existential meaning surfaces
primarily during critical periods in which routines break down".
It should be noted, however, that in many instances of research it may be neither
necessary nor feasible to follow Weber's path, but whatever strategy a scholar may
want to adopt, it should be informed by a clear understanding of what Weber and
others have tried to accomplish in the past. Such understanding may be useful for
the clarification of our own purposes.
Weber's discussion of the nature of objectivity in the social sciences can, in
conclusion, be seen as an attempt to dispel the confusions that, in his view,
surround the relevance of value judgements. As discussed previously, Weber does
not advocate "moral indifference", the elimination of ideals from scientific discussion,
but that social scientists be as clear as possible about their own values and ideals
and their relevance to their work. The crucial problem for methodology is to define
the limits to the intrusion of ideals into scientific analysis so as to avoid the danger
of total subjectivity.
These limits can be understood by reference to the term value-orientation that
Weber borrowed from his contemporary Rickert. "Value-orientation" is both a limit
on social science and the factor which makes it possible. Each new value-
orientation can shed some light upon empirical reality, and when new value-
orientations arise out of contemporary societal problems, fresh questions are asked
of society. Sociological theory can therefore be regarded as the result of an
ongoing dialectic between society and the sociologist. Our ideals determine the
problems to be studied and act as the source of theories and explanations that can
then be verified, like any other scientific analysis.
As stated by David Lee and Howard Newton (1989: 170),
"Weber's methodological writings constitute attempts to reconcile
apparent polar opposites: idealism and the scientific method;
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political commitment and objectivity in the social sciences;
individualism and structured social action. It is because these
dilemmas remain with us today, rather than because of the success
of Weber in resolving them, that Weber's work continues to receive
so much attention".
There can, however, be no doubt that Weber provided essential clues as to how
sociologists can access the substance of social life, and his example provides a
substantive example to those who prefer an interpretative sociology to rigorous
positivism.
James Bohman (1991: 189), in an essay on criticism and explanation, raises the
point that much of social science is practical and value-related in quite a different
sense. It is practical in the technical sense that its explanations supply better
means to solve problems. From Marx forward many social theorists have
attempted to develop a stronger notion of the critical and practical purposes of
social science. Yet Weber argued for a much more limited conception on the
grounds that criticism is theory-laden and theory-dependent, and that this limits
what social science can do. The nature and limits of theoretical knowledge in the
social sciences is of course an epistemological issue, and Bohman argues that
"limits on criticism are often limits on theory, as is the case for Weber" (Ibid.
189).
Weber attempts to exclude certain types of values in his explanation of social
phenomena, specifically those values he refers to as judgements. According to
Weber reference to values is necessary in an explanation of social actions
because such actions are end-directed. Bohman argues that, as a social action,
criticism is itself also oriented to a particular end, that is, to change the attitudes
and beliefs of members of a society (Ibid. 189). Weber would retort that no
substantive value rationality can be achieved, and that values are ultimately a
matter of mere choice or decision. Bohman, however, introduces an interesting
alternative which he derives from his reading of Habermas, that ''the concept of
norms, not values, is the proper way to characterise the moral aspects of social
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reality in that it points to the structuring of social encounters by shared
knowledge, expectations, and rules" (Ibid. 190). Criticism in this view is not
merely a relatively arbitrary choice between moral ends, but an act of
communication. States Bohman, "The contrast between Weber and Habermas
can clarify one main point - namely, that the distinction between facts and values
is an outcome, and not a presupposition, of the commitments of a social theory"
(Ibid. 190). Such a view points to the possibility that critical theory helps us
reflect better on our situation and improve things not by controlling a domain of
phenomena but by changing beliefs and attitudes. This notion will be further
explicated in the final and concluding chapter.
28
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Chapter 2
The social construction of scientific discourse
Weber emphasised the empirical nature of social scientific practice, and the
objectivity of the knowledge that it furnishes. Though, as will be argued in this
thesis, this is a defensible view of the ideal practice of science, it would be
foolish to claim that scientists are detached from their particular cultural
environments. Does the cultural environment of their times impact on the validity
of their findings? If science is a social phenomenon, are scientific beliefs different
from any other beliefs? These questions have been raised in an area of research
called the 'sociology of science', and consequently this chapter will trace
prominent contributions to this debate, through the various conceptions of
science and knowledge in the work of Thomas Kuhn, the 'strong programme' in
the sociology of science, and the ethnographic fieldwork of Bruno Latour and
Steve Woolgar. The final section of the chapter will briefly address the
relationship between science and power, and specifically the notion of
knowledge/power in the work of Foucault. Throughout the chapter comparisons
are drawn between these various contributions to the study of science, and
similarities and divergences are addressed.
Introduction
The modern mind has demanded a specific type of interpretation of the world: its
scientific method has required explanations of phenomena that are concretely
predictive, and therefore impersonal, mechanistic and structural. To this end,
explanations have been systematically "cleansed" of all human and subjective
qualities. In Ernest Gellner's words, "it was Kant's merit to see that this
compulsion for mechanistic impersonal explanations is in us, not in things"
(Gellner, 1975: 206-207). And "it was Weber's to see that it is historically a
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specific kind of mind, not human mind as such, that is subject to this compulsion"
(Ibid. 207).
The historical specificity of knowledge is the fundamental problem raised by
Kuhn - the problem of explaining why in the history of science one paradigm is
chosen over another if paradigms are ultimately incommensurable, that is, if they
cannot be rigorously compared. As Kuhn has pointed out, each paradigm tends
to create its own data and its own way of interpreting those data in a manner that
is so comprehensive and self-validating that scientists operating within different
paradigms seem to exist in altogether different worlds. Nor does any consensus
exist among scientists concerning a common measure or value that could be
used as a universal standard of comparison. Kuhn has argued that ultimately
the decision regarding the validity of knowledge lies with the ongoing scientific
community, which provides the final basis of justification. Yet, as many scientists
have pointed out, this answer seems to undercut the very foundation of the
scientific enterprise, leaving it to the mercy of sociological and personal factors
that subjectively distorts the scientific judgement.
Inspired by Kuhn a flood of detailed historical and sociological studies of the
practice of natural science have come to light. These studies borrowed
methodologies from a variety of sources, including the sociology of knowledge
(Barry Barnes and David Bloor), and ethnographic fieldwork (Bruno Latour and
Steve Woolgar). In contrast to the traditional epistemological debates about
science in which science is idealised and rooted in rational foundations, these
studies describe what actually takes place in science laboratories. Such
descriptions have an empirical and historical orientation, rather than a
philosophical one. It is claimed that the ignorance of most social scientists
regarding the basic features of natural scientific activity is no greater than that
which is routinely faced by sociologists studying other forms of culture. It is
further claimed that any analysis of knowledge must incorporate its inherently
theoretical and constructed character. There is no basic pattern or structure
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inherent in the natural world. Barry Barnes and David Edge, the editors of a
book entitled "Science in context", argue that "nature can be patterned in
different ways: it will tolerate many different orderings without protest", and that
none of these orderings is self-sustaining, and therefore, "specific orderings are
constructed not revealed, invented rather than discovered" (Barnes & Edge,
1982: 5). Hence knowledge has a conventional character, and science is a sub-
culture or set of sub-cultures. More importantly, "science cannot simply be
assumed to be an independent, external agency, pumping expertise into the
social order" (Ibid. 8). Contrary to the position adopted by Max Weber, the
notion that science is or can be protected against the intrusion of external
influences is emphatically challenged. The barrier which protects science from
such influences, whether a rational commitment to scientific method, or a
strongly sanctioned normative order which is definitive of science, is rejected.
According to Barnes and Edge, "the evidence presently available suggest that
'external' influences upon scientific judgement are neither unusual or necessarily
pathological, and that the barrier which such influences have to penetrate is not
fundamentally different from the boundaries surrounding other sub-cultures (Ibid.
9).
Sociologists of scientific knowledge, it is argued, should use the same
procedures to explain "true" and "false" scientific beliefs, practising an
ethnographic indifference to the content of the scientific claims made by the
researcher they studied (Turner (ed.), 1996: 91). It can of course still be
claimed, as it was by Popper in response to Kuhn, that such accounts of the
messy practice of science had no implications for the prescriptions of the
philosophy of good science.
Thomas Kuhn
In recent years, historians and philosophers of science have paid increasing
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attention to the social context of science, a field previously traversed by only a
few sociologists, such as Robert Merton. During these years no theory of the
nature of science has received more attention than Kuhn's. Kuhn's "The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions" was a bold attempt to unite the history of
science, the philosophy of science, and the sociology of science into a theory of
scientific development. Kuhn's well-known thesis is that the history of science
reveals two alternating phases, a period of 'normal science' and a period of
'revolution'. During the first of these scientists proceed with their work within the
frame of the established basic conceptions or 'paradigm' of the peer group. But,
as scientific investigation proceeds, bits of empirical information come forward
that are not consistent with the accepted paradigm. Initially, scientists do not
worry about such apparent falsifications of the basic conceptual framework with
which they are working, but as the anomalies accumulate the established
paradigm becomes increasingly untenable. Eventually, it is cast out by a
'revolution' in scientific thinking, a new paradigm is adopted, and the 'normal'
work of science resumes. Historians of science have been very critical of the
empirical value of Kuhn's central notions of 'paradigm' and 'revolution', and are
not inclined to accept his model as a satisfactory depiction of the actual history of
science. As stated by Scott Gordon, "in effect, Kuhn was attempting to state a
universal 'law of history', and his thesis, like other similar propositions about
history, is more speculative than empirical" (Gordon, 1991: 616).
Kuhn conceptualises a paradigm shift as akin to a religious conversion, that
scientists are 'born again' and look at the world through new eyes. As different
paradigms are incommensurable there are no general criteria or common
measures that can be used to determine whether one paradigm is better than
another is. Consequently Kuhn diverges radically from Popper regarding the
question of progress in scientific knowledge, or even the possibility of
differentiating scientific from non-scientific propositions. Convention becomes
the sole criteria of validity. Good science is consequently conceived as being in
accord with the paradigm convention of the scientific peer group, and when that
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convention changes, it becomes bad science.
In response to his theory, a deluge of criticism was brought down on Kuhn. The
main thrust of this criticism pointed out that his conception deprives science of
any claim to being an empirically controlled method of objective inquiry, or even
one that is rational. Scott Gordon points out that, as a consequence, Kuhn
significantly modified his original position, arguing that a paradigm is not such an
autonomous ontological conception that it is immune from empirical tests that
scientists routinely apply, nor that paradigms are absolutely incommensurable
and immune to the usual epistemic criteria of theory choice. States Gordon,
"with such admissions, however, Kuhn's theory of science falls to
the ground. A 'paradigm' becomes merely a theoretical hypothesis,
perhaps one that is more central to a field of science than others,
but not differing from them in any fundamental way. A 'revolution'
in science becomes simply a period of exceptionally rapid advance,
initiated by discoveries that prove to be unusually fruitful in the
investigation of old problems or in opening up new lines of scientific
inquiry" (Ibid. 617).
Despite Kuhn's partial retractions and qualifications, the notion of a paradigm
became extremely popular amongst social scientists and is still popular today.
Though Kuhn may have overstated the ontological autonomy of paradigmatic
propositions, he did usefully point to the fact that in some fields of science core
propositions are adhered to despite evidence to the contrary. The science of
economics is a case in point, for its adherence to a conception of consumers and
producers as rational utilitarian agents, in spite of conflicting empirical
experience and psychological theories such as Freud's regarding the non-
rational foundations of human actions. More incisive perhaps is the fact that
Kuhn drew attention to the social nature of science, more especially the role of
peer groups as the basis of established authority. It is this aspect of Kuhn's work
that became the impetus behind the Edinburgh School's strong programme in
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the sociology of science.
The 'Strong Programme' in the Sociology of Science
It is no longer just that there are doubts as to whether the social sciences can be
more like the natural sciences, it is widely recognised that the natural sciences
are much more deeply culturally and theoretically constructed than traditional
and textbook accounts of science have suggested.
It would be foolish to claim that scientists are totally detached from their
particular cultural environments. As such the 'sociology of science' explores a
part of our culture and history that is of great importance, indeed of growing
importance, as the role of science in all societies widens and deepens. This
form of research has recently received considerable attention. In its boldest form
this area of research claims that the attempt of philosophers to establish the
epistemological foundations of science are misguided. Science is a social
phenomenon that should be studied by sociological methods just as any other
social phenomena, be it mores, religion, deviance, etc.
The notion that external factors, such as political, social, or economic
environment playa significant role in science has a long history, especially with
respect to the social sciences. The leading figures of the 'Edinburg School',
David Bloor and Barry Barnes, carry this notion a step further. In their view
scientists are dominated by their cultural ambience in all aspects of their work
and thought. It determines not only their choices of problems to investigate, but
their philosophical conception of the nature of science and the criteria of
warrantablility that they use in evaluating beliefs. All beliefs are considered
epistemically 'symmetrical', whether they are beliefs about observable
phenomena, philosophical principles, or the power of witchcraft. As stated by
Barnes and Bloor (see Hollis & Lukes (eds.), 1982: 23), "it is not that all beliefs
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are equally true or equally false, but that regardless of truth and falsity the fact of
their credibility is to be seen as equally problematic". In a book entitled Interests
and the growth of knowledge (1977: 25), Barnes states that "what matters is that
we recognise the sociological equivalence of different knowledge claims".
Consequently science, which are sets of beliefs like any other, should not make
pretensions to rational detachment, and is construed as a purely empirical social
phenomenon. The empirical nature of this form of inquiry thus leads to the claim
by Bloor and Barnes that they are practising a "science of science".
David Bloor, in an essay entitled "A Sociological Theory of Objectivity" (see
Brown, 1984: 229-245), proposes the theory that objectivity is social. The
impersonal and stable character of some of our beliefs is seen to derive from the
fact that beliefs are social institutions. In Durkheimian fashion beliefs that are
objective do not belong to any individual. They have an external thing-like
aspect to them, and a theory of objectivity must address the object-like stability
of the things we believe in, "the external, compelling character of the standards,
rules and procedures that we use" (Ibid. 229). The specifications that something
must meet in order to merit the title 'objective' is accounted for by reference to
social institutions. Taken-for-granted practices are sanctioned by a group, they
are shared, and have the quality of being external to the individual. This leads to
the identification of the objective with the social, not as a deduction, but as a
conjecture with 'suggestive power' and 'problem-solving capacity' (Ibid. 229).
In a comparison with Popper's treatment of the same subject, Bloor interprets
Popper's 'world three', the objective world of intelligibles, as the social world.
This world for which Popper claims 'relative autonomy', is really the social world,
though in Bloor's opinion, Popper's metaphysical terminology obscures this fact.
Bloor emphasises that his reading of Popper is not meant to be true to Popper's
intentions, and ironically, Popper himself could obviously not defend his theory in
terms of subjective intentions and remain internally consistent. Be that as it may,
Popper's claim is that objective knowledge is 'knowledge without a knowing
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subject'. Bloor takes this to mean that "objective knowledge refers to something
like the state of a discipline, or the state of culture, at any given time" (Ibid. 232).
The discipline of physics, for instance, does not refer to what any individual
physicist knows, but to the "entire corpus of standards, conventions, paradigms,
accepted results and procedures", and consequently, physics is the "property of
the collectivity and the role" (Ibid. 232). Thus Popper's claim that the activity of
understanding consists in operating with third world objects "becomes the claim
that our intellectual operations proceed by the use of socially given categories
and socially shared meanings" (Ibid. 233).
A defender of Popper's theory would argue that our beliefs and assertions have
logical implications, which is a vitally important feature of knowledge, and that
this feature can consequently not be explained by a social theory. Bloor claims
to do so is to postulate a quasi-autonomous world of objective knowledge, which
exists independently of our constructions and which can be discovered. Just as
"the eye can literally see a physical object, he says, so the mind can similarly
'see' intellectual objects" (Ibid. 234). Bloor's contention is that this does not solve
the problem of how to know whether we are seeing the right object, and that the
talk of discovery conceals the act of creation.
Bloor is of course drawing on the work of Wittgenstein, and more pertinently the
well-known work of Peter Winch, as a resource. Wittgenstein's analysis of
meaning and rule-following, and his observation that "no course of action could
be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made to accord
with the rule", leads to Bloor's assertion that "ultimately it is action which
determines meaning, not meaning which determines action" (Ibid. 235).
Consequently, differences in social organisation ought to be connected with the
differences in how knowledge is organised. If something is objective by virtue of
its being a social institution, then variations in objectivity should be reducible to,
and located in, variations in the institutions that give rise to knowledge. The idea
that objectivity resides in experience and that objective knowledge can be known
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directly and immediately, raises the question of who has believed that reality is
directly given in experience, and why they have believed it. Bloor contends that
these questions reveal that empiricism has functioned as the ideology of
scientific professionalism due to two explanatory principles, namely, the social
use of nature, and the idea of group interests, on which I will elaborate in the
following section.
If the causes of the variation in objectivity are social, then they are whatever
moves people to try to alter their institutions. According to Bloor "the manner
and character of its variation are, accordingly, defined and limited by the range of
options that we have in organising our social life. If these are endless, then the
forms of knowledge will be endless. If they are limited and revolve around a
small range of basic possibilities, then so will the forms of objectivity. These are
matters for further study" (Ibid. 245). This theme has a lot in common with the
postmodernist conception of local knowiedges, yet surprisingly, and contrary to
postmodernism, the Edinburgh school is unashamedly naturalistic. As stated by
James Brown, "the main point is that the sociologist is a scientist too, and ought
to act as scientists do; he or she should try to characterise knowledge in a
scientific fashion. 'If sociology could not be applied in a thorough-going way to
scientific knowledge it would mean' concludes Bloor, "that science could not
scientifically know itself" (Ibid. 10 -11).
In this regard Barry Barnes, in a text entitled "Interests and the growth of
knowledge", distinguishes the orientation of the philosopher or epistemologist
from that of the sociologist. The sociologist is concerned with "the naturalistic
understanding of what people take to be knowledge, and not with the evaluative
assessment of what deserves so to be taken" (Barnes, 1977: 7). Knowledge
here is understood 'naturalistically' in terms of causes, and not evaluatively in
terms of good or bad, appropriate or inappropriate reasons. All supposedly
internal, normative questions cannot be distinguished from external causal ones.
This conception of explanation is surprisingly empiricist, considering that Kuhn's
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account of scientific revolutions is taken as a guide. Barnes and Bloor
repeatedly state that the sociology of knowledge should give strictly causal
explanations of beliefs which are "concerned with the conditions which bring
about beliefs or states of knowledge" (Bloor, 1976: 4-5). Bloor elaborates four
tenets of a causal, anti-normative approach:
"1. CAUSALITY. It would be causal, that is concerned with the conditions, which
bring about belief or states of knowledge. Naturally there will be other types
of causes apart from social ones which will cooperate in bringing about
belief.
2. IMPARTIALITY. It would be impartial with respect to truth and falsity,
rationality or irrationality, success or failure. Both sides of these dichotomies
will require explanation.
3. SYMMETRY. It would be symmetrical in its style of explanation. The same
types of cause would explain, say, true and false beliefs.
4. REFLEXIVITY. It would be reflexive. In principle its patterns of explanation
would have to be applicable to sociology itself. Like the requirement of
symmetry this is a response to the need to seek for general explanations. It
is an obvious requirement of principle; otherwise sociology would be a
standing refutation of its own theories" (Bloor, 1984: 10).
The conditions which bring about beliefs are conceived by Bloor as primarily,
though not exclusively, social, having to do with what is called 'interests', rather
than internalised norms as in the case of Talcott Parsons. In this view the
problem with past sociologies of knowledge is that they exempted science from
proper analysis by claiming that it is interest-free. Even the sociology of
knowledge itself should, reflexively, be explained causally. Their naturalistic and
empiricist orientation leads to a view that science is the best way to explain both
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the social and the natural sciences, and that good science explains things
causally.
James Bohman, in his analysis of the 'strong programme', argues that Barnes'
and Bloor's appeal to the empirical successes of their studies, in order to silence
philosophical critics, provide the opposite effect of what they desire to indicate.
Says Bohman, these empiricist studies "provide good empirical reasons to reject
the programme's causal approach, insofar as they fail not only to explain the
necessary and sufficient conditions for scientific beliefs, but even to show clear
explanatory connections between natural knowledge and social contexts"
(Bohman, 1991: 41).
Barnes and Bloor may well answer that all theories are underdetermined by the
evidence, and that theories are empirically equivalent, that the choice between
them must be determined on grounds other than rational ones, for reasons other
than the appeal to evidence. According to Bloor, rationally justified beliefs must
still be explained, and the same processes cause true and false beliefs. Causal
explanations of the practice of science are required not because of the
internalisation of norms, but because of what Barnes and Bloor call the
'symmetry principle'. As stated by Bohman, "the symmetry referred to is
between rational and irrational belief formation: there is no significant difference
between explanations of true and false beliefs (Ibid. 41). Causal explanation is
not confined to 'bad science', tainted by external factors which lead to wrong
conclusions, because the same sort of causes generate both good and bad
science. Consequently, since rational evaluation is indeterminate in all cases,
the 'real reason' that scientific beliefs are adopted must be explained by
sociological causes such as interests, pressures and forces, which are
naturalistically described by Barnes and Bloor. What is, however, not clear, is
why the unmasking of interests is necessary if evaluative criteria are
insignificant.
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Bohman comments that the 'strong programme' is methodologically doomed to
failure, that "its explanations will always be indeterminate and fall short of giving
the required necessary and sufficient conditions for belief formation", that social
interests or forces "cannot form the basis of an adequate account of determining
causes for intentional actions in scientific practices, even granting the symmetry
principle" (Ibid. 43). What is clear is that the explanations of the strong
programme rest on the assumption of a strong tendency to conformity in human
behaviour. They have, however, not formulated the process of socialisation or
the formation of class identity, which might account for how many factors work
determinately enough to be explanations. Their conception of science seems to
be that of a coercive, controlling institution, both through force and authority. By
rejecting the internal perspective of practitioners in science as being inadequate
for explanations, the strong programme overlooks an important source, the
explanations of reflective participants in practices.
We are left with a theoretical hypothesis which does not consistently apply its
own empiricism. The criteria of theory choice are presented as no more than
social conventions that scientists have be enculturated to accept. As Scott
Gordon points out, "it does not demonstrate that the Newtonian theory of the
planetary system is merely a social convention of Western-educated
astronomers" (Gordon, 1991: 622). "The contention that beliefs have causes
does not mean that all beliefs have the same causes, much less that 'social
factors' are the only causes that operate in the domain of human mentation"
(Ibid. 622).
The ethnography of science: Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar
Bruno Latour's early collaboration with Steve Woolgar, "Laboratory Life", was the
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first significant laboratory field study of scientific practice. Woolgar and Latour
describe their analysis as an "ethnography of the sciences", using methods of
participant observation in an actual laboratory setting. The term 'anthropology' or
'ethnography' is defined as taking a particular perspective, that of a stranger.
Because of its phenomenological background, ethnomethodology pursues a
methodological ideal of pure 'documentary' description, and in common with the
'strong programme', emphasises the active character of social judgements.
What is considered important is what members of a setting actually do, not what
they think they do. Detailed descriptions of the actual practice of science reveal
explanations of unnoticed aspects of everyday activities. The details of the
description often contradict what scientists themselves believe about their own
activities, and as such description itself can become critical.
In an interview with T. Hugh Crawford, Latour points out what he considers to be
a serious flaw in the 'strong programme', the proposed symmetrical approach to
the study of science and society. He acknowledges his debt to Barnes and Bloor
for showing that "we should not explain false belief and accepted truth in different
ways", "but it is only halfway done, because the symmetry is obtained by giving a
social explanation of both true knowledge and false belief" (File:
///A/Latour.HTM).
Latour's argument is that though Bloor has remedied the asymmetry which
explains true science with nature and false science with society, "his remedy is
also an asymmetrical argument because he explains both in terms of the social"
(Ibid. 6). In Bloor the social is only one half of the explanation, but the other half
is not clear. Latour suggests that we follow what Michel Calion refers to as "the
generalised principle of symmetry", that we treat society and nature
symmetrically. Says Latour, "this new symmetry principle is much different from
Bloor because Bloor is a radical Durkheimian thinker, which is to say that society
'up there' should be able to explain true and false belief in the same terms .... the
inputs of nature being necessary to anchor our beliefs, but not to shape them"
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(Ibid. 6).
It is Latour's contention that the social sciences have no 'out there' or 'up there'
that serves as a foundation, but that the notions of 'up there' and 'out there' are
themselves created in the "laboratory", a "special type of laboratory where things
like the notion of force and social groups are located and then re-extended
outside" (Ibid. 7). Says Latour,
"once you have this dichotomy between the representation of
humans in the political sciences and the representation of the non-
human which is basically taken over by science, there are two
critical tasks: one of them is defined by the first enlightenment
which is to say that natural science now sees through the
obscurantism of the past. The second task comes from the
knowledge of the emerging social sciences, so that we can now
see through the mistakes, aberrations, and arrogance of the natural
sciences. Both of these tasks are to see through the naturalisation
of discourse, and are grounded in our belief in the social sciences"
(lbid.7).
There is a striking similarity between Latour's notion of the naturalization of
discourse and Marx's theory of ideology in Capital. There phenomenal forms are
seen to correspond to natural forms due to the opacity of reality. Ideological
illusions are seen to have their origin in the phenomenal forms of reality itself,
rather than due to the intention to deceive others or from self-deception. In
Marx's words, phenomenal forms appear "directly and spontaneously as current
modes of thought" (Mepham & Ruben (eds.), 1979: 149).
For Latour there is a complete similarity between the internal divide between the
"representation" of the human and non-human, and the external divide between
the cultures of the natural and social sciences. More particularly, Latour's
ethnomethodology aims to show the constructed character of what scientists
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take to be natural or eternal facts. His description has an alienating,
defamiliarising effect, like the view of an ethnographer from another culture on
our own practices. As stated by Bohman in his analysis of ethnomethodology as
a form of social criticism, "what is immediate now becomes mediated, what is
familiar becomes dependent on a web of shared expectations" (Bohman, 1991:
204). In this way the method of ethnographic description, turned inward,
provides critical distance. Reality is not conceived as an objective fact, but as a
construct, showing the socially constructed character of the objectivities of
everyday life. In applying this method to scientific practices Latour provides a
new, non-causal basis for the sociology of science, and consequently avoids the
difficulties of the interest-based explanations of the strong programme. Though
claiming to be "materialist", this approach is not concerned with macro-structural
causation as in the case of the strong programme's "interests", but with how
facts are produced locally in their micro-settings. Tracing their production
through a purely descriptive approach paradoxically has the critical effect of
changing our false beliefs about science.
In "Laboratory Life" Latour and Woolgar contend that science in its finished and
polished form conceals the process of making scientific knowledge. Just as in
the case of ethnomethodological studies of how gender is constructed in
everyday interaction, their studies find the process of construction of facts in the
laboratory to be a "contingent and negotiated order", in no way different from
everyday practical activities. This contingent order is obscured by "finished
science", as opposed to "science in the making". The observers of "science in
the making" look beyond the self-descriptions of scientists just as anthropologists
do who "refuse to bow before the knowledge of a primitive sorcerer" (Latour &
Wooigar, 1979: 29).
The model of anthropology, which is employed here, is not that of interpretative
anthropologists, but must claim to know more than the scientists themselves,
"secluded" as they are by naïve beliefs about the "authority of science". Instead
of the taken-for-granted picture we have of science as being organised and
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coherent, science in the making "in fact consists of a disordered array of
observations with which scientists struggle to produce order" (Latour, 1987: 36).
Once the ethnographic gaze sees through the sociological micro-foundations of
scientific order, we can "deconstruct" the very idea of "hard facts" and "objects",
which now is "nothing but inscriptions". Says Latour, "the object now emerging is
a completely new object that doesn't have the classical features of objectivity.
As Serres says, it is a 'quasi-object' because it does not have the characteristics
of a naturalistic object. For example, what is anthropogenic heat? Of course it is
human: it is socially constructed, because it is our heat produced by our
pollution; but it has the scale of the planet, so it is a natural phenomenon"
(Latour, HTM: 11). Introducing the notion of quasi-objects is seen as a way of
addressing the realisVconstructivistdebate. Redefining both nature and society
as agents in association creates a way out of the dilemma of treating
constructions as causes. Also, changes in society are seen to affect the natural
environment, and those changes, in turn, affect society. Thus, as argued by
Ulrich Beck, today "nature is society and society is also nature", with the result
that nature has been politicised, and natural scientists, like social scientists, have
had their work politicised (Beck in Ritzer, 1996: 576).
Surprisingly, and in stark contrast to post-modern theory, Latour assumes that
we live in a non-modern world, that is, "the retrospective realisation that from the
beginning of the scientific revolution, we have never been modern. These
revolutions have never happened. We have never been cut off from our past;
we have never been different" (Latour, HTM: 11). The notion of quasi-objects is
used to cross the boundary between people and things, a concept which Latour
says we have to invent and use, and ultimately drop, in order to "trace and define
a social relation that is not social, and a natural relation that is not naturalised"
(lbid.12). The notion of concepts as heuristic devices is proposed because,
contrary to postmodernism, we should not use culture, the content of science, or
discourse as the cause of phenomenon. The idea is to avoid a "metalanguage"
and trace an "infralanguage". The challenge is to give an explanation where
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discourse, society and nature are the consequences and not the causes. This
accords with the first rule of method in "Science in Action", that you follow the
scientists as they are working and do not wait until the object or the meaning is
completely constructed. The question that this raises is, of course, what is it that
is following the scientists? Is the infralanguage' being used coming from the field
which is studied, and not from the ethnomethodologist? If done successfully, this
would mean that the terms of the explanation would make criticism of them
impossible.
In common with the Edinburgh School, the "norms of inquiry" are seen to play
little role in explaining actual research. The operative norms are prestige,
honour, and status within a particular social network, not the disinterested search
for truth. Consequently norms like objectivity are conceived more as rhetorical
devices than determinants of scientific activity. Moreover, a recurrent theme in
both "Laboratory Life" and "Science in Action" is the description of the political
character of truth claims in science, of the process by which some claims
become authoritative and immune from criticism (Bohman, 1991: 207).
Latour treats the truth claims of science in a similar fashion to the way Marx
demystifies the claims of capitalism. The taken-for-granted notions of capitalism,
that the economy is self-equilibrating, or that profit comes from exchange, is
exposed through detailed documentary descriptions of how commodity
production in capitalist societies actually works. Latour similarly tries to show
descriptively that an average person would be unable to refute the claims of a
scientist who has expensive instruments to produce facts, and hence raises the
costs of making claims to the contrary. A close analysis of the 'textual process'
by which truth claims come to be accepted in the sciences, demystifies the
'accepted' view of scientific discourse. Science is not viewed as a democratic
and consensual endeavour, but as a highly competitive and antagonistic one, as
illustrated by the defensive methods of writing and presenting a scientific paper
to be objection-proof (Ibid. 208).
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Reality, or "out-there-ness", is a consequence of scientific work rather than its
cause. As stated by Bohman, "reality is produced through having a claim
accepted and embedded in other claims in other scientific papers; it is a reflexive
accountability of social action, in the scientific community rather than any 'fit' with
the facts" (Ibid. 208). In intertextual fashion particular facts come to be accepted
by being cited by others, they become a "black box", an unquestioned
assumption, and the "black box" becomes increasingly less likely to be
reopened. Moreover, resources and instruments are accumulated to defend the
claim, making argument and debate more and more costly.
Clearly, laboratory studies do present a potentially powerful criticism of our
accepted beliefs of scientific authority and knowledge. What is not clear is how
we should change our beliefs about science and its practice. Do we conclude
that science is a part of our web of beliefs, like any other belief, or does this
analysis have more radical implications? The traditional conception of the
research process treats the techniques, methodologies and theories of research
as essentially separate from its political, organisational and administrative
context. Likewise, almost all sociological methods texts assume that
researchers work on their own, make their own decisions and otherwise proceed
in isolation of the demands of their colleagues, their institutions and discipline.
Both the Edinburgh School and Latour and Woolgar, criticise the distinction
between research and its social and cultural context.
But what does it mean to talk about understanding the research process in its
social and cultural context? Does it suggest that we just need to juxtapose a
description of researchers at work with another description of the prevailing
social circumstances? It would seem that this is decidedly not what these
authors are claiming. To place the technical details of research alongside a
description of social circumstance, you would still imply that the two domains are
basically discrete, that they are separate from, though in some way connected
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to, each other. What they explore are more profound senses in which research
is social. Latour states that "you can't alternate between social realism and
naturalism, and then throw in some semiotics or discourse analysis. You must
do the three together; then immediately you realise that in science studies we
have, all along, been studying phenomena that have the characteristics of being
narrative, collective, and outside. They are quasi-objects, they are not of our
own making. We build them collectively, and they are narrated. That is it: real,
narrated, social" (Latour, HTM: 11).
Clearly Latour avoids the thoroughgoing naturalism of the Edinburgh School with
a far more reflexive approach. What I know about an object is always shaped by
how I reflexively envision it. There is no pure objectivity, nor, for that matter, is
there any pure subjectivity. Everything is impure. As reflected in the post-
modern concept of 'intertextuality', everything is contaminated by everything
else, and in relationship to everything else. "It is merely a universe of discourse,
a rhetoric based on action that is itself only discourse" (Latour in Rosenau, 1992:
111). States Rosenau,
"this discourse takes the form of a power game, a struggle, a war
with verbal negotiation, pressure, lobbying, and other elements
designed to gain support, to enrol, to mobilise resources, that in the
end assures an intellectual monopoly for the product" (Ibid. 111).
The claim is that no external reality exists which can serve as the ultimate
arbitrator, and that in employing social science research techniques, the process
of conforming to the rules leads to the scientist, in turn, being "constructed" by
the research process. Rosenau cites Latour's well-known claim that "even
scientific procedures such as pasteurization are said to have re-created social
and intellectual life when bacteria, microbes, became social actors outside the
laboratory and moved into society" (Ibid. 113). This raises the suspicion that
Latour, like self-proclaimed postmodernists, can only argue about the existence
of an independent reality because they are "insulated from reality, never
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personally experience the violence, terror, and degradation prevalent in modern
society" (Ibid. 111).
By introducing the notion of quasi-objects Latour attempts to avoid the pitfalls of
a thoroughgoing constructivist argument, yet makes claims in line with a social
constructivist framework by conceptualising knowledge claims, especially
scientific ones, as power moves and not moves towards truth. As in the case of
Foucault's work on the human sciences, Latour conceptualises natural science
as a product of power and knowledge, of a politics of truth.
Yet, as will be explored in the following section, in contrast to Latour and
Woolgar, Foucault's explanations make no reference to the intentions of
scientists. As stated by Bohman, "the creation of ever-extending networks of
power and knowledge work not because scientists do not follow the norms and
ideals of their practice, but precisely because they in fact do so" (Bohman, 1991:
209). Such networks of knowledge and power, in Foucault's view, are revealed
only by adopting an external perspective, as in the case of Foucault's use of
power to explain the human sciences. For Latour and Woolgar, on the other
hand, the test of the validity of their explanations is that the observers' and the
participants' accounts must be identical, not different and external. Their claim
is, however, not supported by their studies themselves, which often emphasise
aspects of scientific practice which are dismissed by natural scientists as trivial
or unimportant. States Bohman, this
"puts Latour and Woolgar's criticism on the horns of an irresolvable
dilemma: either they go the way of Foucault and Durkheim and
deny any import to intentions and beliefs, or they must really
produce an identical and internalist account, in which case there is
no demystification or deconstruction of beliefs about facts" (Ibid.
210).
In fact, since the norms of inquiry are not addressed, no adequate criticisms are
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advanced that could change anyone's belief about such norms. In contrast
Foucault's analysis of power in the human sciences does not deny the role of
norms in the explanation of research practices, on the contrary, the political
nature of the norms of inquiry are produced through these very same norms.
Latour and Woolgar can only offer a criticism of the practice of natural science by
being selective about the aspects of participants' knowledge to which they
appeal, and more importantly, by limiting their descriptions to the level of
everyday knowledge. This leaves the ethnography of science, as in the case of
postmodernism, open to the possibility of competing descriptions, which raises
the question of the explanatory importance of the very normative elements which
they do not address.
Power/Knowledge: Foucault
The analytical and empirical study of power forms a central area of social
investigation. For this reason, as has often been noted, 'power' has become one
of the most disputed and contested of all sociological concepts. Paradoxically
everyone knows what the word' power' means, until asked to formulate a precise
definition. No definition of power has been able to attain universal support
amongst social scientists. The reason for this is that the various conceptions of
power do not simply depend on the 'facts' of the case, but on disciplinary
conventions, theoretical conceptions, and political values.
It has been argued by Steven Lukes (1986. 26) that power, at the most
fundamental level, can be said to refer to the idea of "bringing about
consequences". That is to say, power must be seen as involving the production
of causal effects; "the absolutely basic core to, or primitive notion lying behind,
all talk of power is the notion that A in some way affects B" (Ibid. 26). In this
generic sense of power as 'cause', power can, of course, be seen as a feature of
all human action. Power is, indeed, integral to the very concept of human
agency, that is, the transformative capacity of people. Lukes argues that two
49
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
distinct concepts of power have emerged in the history of social thought. The
first of these concepts sees power as arising wherever A affects B in a manner
that is contrary to B's interests. Such an approach sees power relations as
asymmetrical, as 'zero-sum' relations which involve actions in which there is
potential resistance or conflict between agents. Power is, from this point of view,
an element in a conflict of sectional interests. This sectional, interest-based
concept can be contrasted to the second concept of power that Lukes identifies,
the non-sectional or non-zero concept, which sees power as existing only in and
through processes of legitimation. Power is seen as a collective capacity that
arises from structures of consensual communal organisation.
Choices between the interest-based or sectional concept, and the legitimation-
based and non-sectional concept, is not a simple matter. Any choice of
theoretical concept raises questions of values. The choice between definitions is
however not purely a matter of value judgements. There can be good theoretical
or empirical grounds for preferring one concept of power over another. Thus
Lukes has suggested that the non-sectional concept of power is less valuable
than the sectional concept because it systematically ignores the central issues
which have always prompted scholars to study power. The proponents of the
non-sectional concept "focus on the locution 'power to', ignoring 'power over'.
Thus power indicates a 'capacity', a 'facility', and 'ability', not a relationship.
Accordingly, the conflictual aspect of power - the fact that is exercised over
people - disappears altogether from view" (Ibid. 9-64).
In this chapter, however, the focus is not upon the analytical penetration of
differing political conceptions of power and interests, but upon the socio-
historical process of their formation. The relationship between power and
interests is also not simple. Different conceptions of what interests are, are
associated with different moral and political positions. The point is that any view
of power rests on some normatively specific conception of interests. Is it
legitimate, for example, to go beyond the subjective, conscious interests of
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agents and attempt to identify 'objective interests' which people may deny or of
which they may be unaware? Power, then, stands in a complex relationship to
intentions, wants, knowledge, and interests. The outcomes of power
"will be related to the desires and beliefs of the powerful, or those
they present, either (directly) through their intentions or (indirectly
or directly) via their interests, and, unless otherwise specified, they
will involve effects on welfare, limits on freedom, distributive
advantage or the securing of collective goods, or some
combination of these" (Lukes, 1986: 13).
Power, then, according to Lukes, should be understood in sectional, interest-
based terms as strategic action within structural constraints. The question is
how this view is to be developed and made useful for the construction of
research strategies? One of the most fruitful attempts to do this can be found in
the work of Denis Wrong (1979). Wrong has argued that power is a capacity or
disposition that mayor may not be realised in action. Force, manipulation and
persuasion are, according to Wrong, the most general mechanisms that are
involved in power relations of all kinds. These mechanisms of power can
operate in interpersonal contexts, but they can also be involved in the
establishment of stable institutional structures of power that have been the
principal concerns of those who have undertaken research on social power. To
describe these institutional relations we may use the Weberian term 'domination'.
An individual or group exercises domination when it can issue a command to
others and can be certain that this will result in obedience. Wrong consequently
recognises the concept of legitimate domination or 'authority', and suggests,
following Weber, that 'traditional' or 'rational' legitimisation have been the most
common basis of legitimate domination. What Wrong has shown in the
consideration of power, domination and legitimacy, is the fact that power can be
properly understood only if it is connected to the larger cultural context of
legitimisation and to the material distribution of resources. More importantly, for
the purposes of this thesis, is the distinction which Wrong makes between "latent
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power" and "possible power". Wrong argues that to ignore the difference
between possible power and realised power, is to "mistakenly attribute power to
groups whose power is merely possible and where a long process of social
mobilisation and indoctrination would have to take place before it can become a
reality" (Ibid. 9). In Wrong's view to locate the ultimate seats of power in the
group structure of power is to "ignore Weber's insistence that society is a system
of meanings as well as of interacting persons and confines us to the appearance
and surface of social life" (Ibid. 9).
One of the earliest writers to explore this was, of course, Max Weber, who saw
the social distribution of power as expressed in the relations of class, status, and
party. In an article entitled "The Disciplinary Society: from Weber to Foucault",
John O'Neill argues that Foucault is thereby seen to complement Weber's
formal-rational concept of bureaucracy and legal domination with "a physiology
of bureaucracy and power" which is the definitive feature of a disciplinary society
(O'Neill, 1987: 42-60). Although Foucault does not study the bureaucratic
process in the Weberian mode, his studies of the prison, hospital and school "go
beyond Weber in grounding the legal-rational accounting process in techniques
for the administration of corporeal, attitudinal and behavioural discipline" (Ibid.
45).
O'Neill views the works of Weber and Foucault in terms of a convergence upon a
simple question, namely, what are the techniques by which man has subjected
himself to the rational discipline of the applied human sciences? O'Neill does not
consider it far-fetched to view Weber as an archaeologist of the power man
exerts over himself, and thus as a precursor of Foucault's conception of the
disciplinary society. In the case of both writers, history is not conceived as
containing some rational essence, as in the case of Marx, even though it is
understood as a process of increasing rationalisation. Of course, neither thinker
is entirely "intelligible apart from Marx's analytic concerns", but both are closer to
Nietzsche than to Marx in their grasp of "the radical finitude of human rationality"
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(Ibid. 43).
What distinguishes Foucault from Weber, however, is his interest in how forms of
rationality inscribe themselves in practices or systems of practices, and what role
they play within them. His primary unit of analysis is that of 'discourse'. As
stated by Mark Philip, "a discourse is best understood as a system of possibility
for knowledge" (my emphasis) (Skinner (ed.), 1985: 69). In similar fashion to
Wittgenstein's conceptions of 'modes of social life' and 'language games',
Foucault's method is to try to identify the rules that permit certain statements to
be made, and how these rules lead us to identify statements as true or false.
These rules become more apparent when an "object of discourse is modified or
transformed, as when homicidal monomania becomes viewed as moral
degeneration or paranoid schizophrenia" (Ibid. 69). Consequently statements
become true or false by virtue of our having ways to reason about them. A
discourse is a way of reasoning, one that makes certain forms of knowledge
possible, and excludes other ways of reasoning. But these rules "are not rules
which individuals consciously follow; a discourse is not a method or a canon of
inquiry", rather, "these rules provide the necessary preconditions for the
formation of statements, and as such operate' behind the backs' of speakers of a
discourse" (Ibid. 69). As a result our classificatory systems do not simply mirror
enduring features of the natural world, and "the relationship between words and
things is always partial and rooted in discursive rules and commitments which
cannot themselves be rationally justified" (Ibid. 70). In fact, it is precisely
because rationality does not play a role in the foundations for discourse that
Foucault emphasises rapture and discontinuity in the history of ideas.
What is more pertinent to the theme of this thesis is Foucault's emphasis on the
constitutive role that power plays in knowledge. As stated by Sarup, "Foucault
inverts, following Nietzsche, the common-sense view of the relation between
power and knowledge. Whereas we might normally regard knowledge as
providing us with power to do things that without it we could not do, Foucault
argues that knowledge is power over others, the power to define others" (Sarup,
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1988: 73). Modern societies are seen to pay ever-increasing attention to the
psychology of the individual, and in law, for instance, the intentions of the
individual in the act of transgression becomes the central criterion of culpability.
In contrast to the feudal and monarchial systems of the past, modern societies
are characterised by the exercise of disciplinary power which is interiorised
through prescriptions of what is considered 'normal', and as a consequence
each person becomes his or her own policeman. These "disciplinary
technologies" are both a form of power and a mode of knowledge. Power and
knowledge are not separate entities. Contrary to the notion of knowledge as
liberating, knowledge takes the form of technical control, and contrary to the
conception of power as merely repressive, power is seen as productive. Power
both enables and constrains us, this is what makes power a transformative social
force. States Carlo Frigerio, "for Foucault the reduction of power to repression is
not only inadequate, it is dangerous. It makes us think that the liberation
struggle can be won by demarking 'truths' that have been made invisible by the
mechanisms of power" (Frigerio in Mouton (ed.), 1990: 328). As was seen
previously in the case of Latour, "beliefs cannot be cut oft from the social
practices in which they are embodied, nor can beliefs be measured against a
given reality existing outside those practices" (Ibid. 328).
Foucault states that "it is not power, but the subject, which is the general theme
of my research" (Douglas and Rabinow (eds.), 1982: 208). This notion of the
"subject" refers to the "double character" of man, that he is both the subject who
produces knowledge, while at the same time being the object of that knowledge
through the practices of the human sciences. More specifically, it is the positivist
tradition in the human sciences which "inverts" truths about man. As Frigerio
(see Mouton & Joubert, 1990: 323-330) relates, defining norms, deviances and
pathologies, and prescribing treatments for them, "a plethora of experts have
emerged who dictate how human beings have to be measured against the norm,
and these classified and disciplined accordingly". This is what Foucault means
by "made subjects" (Ibid. 324). In common with both the' Edinburgh School' and
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Latour, questions of epistemology are treated as questions of social order, or as
stated by Frigerio, "Foucault's analyses of the genealogy of modern medicine,
legal systems, psychology and criminology reveal that epistemology and politics
are ineluctably intertwined in power/knowledge technologies and in apparatuses
(dispositifs) by which human beings are made subjects and treated as objects"
(Ibid. 324).
Foucault does not view power as a possession or a capacity. It is
conceptualised as having the pervasive character of a network that extends
everywhere. Consequently, as stated by Sarup,
"Foucault suggests that an analysis of power should concentrate
not on the level of conscious intention but on the point of
application of power. In other words, he wants to shift attention
from questions such as 'who has power?' or 'what intentions or
aims do power holders have?' to processes by which subjects are
constituted as effects of power" (Sarup, 1988: 82).
Power itself creates and causes the emergence of new objects of knowledge,
and ultimately how we observe and talk about what we observe. How precisely
power influences how and what it is possible to know is however not clear. As
stated by Latour, "he slashes knowledge/power, but adding the slash does not
solve the problem" (Latour, HTM). Latour argues that the slash conceals the
asymmetrical nature of the analyses, for though we need knowledge in order to
exert power, power tends to overshadow knowledge in Foucault's work.
We are left in the dark as to how specifically power affects the knowledge which
production it facilitates. By reducing what we can know to convention and
avoiding questions of epistemology, truth comes to play no part in the
transformation of knowledge. Truth is always relative to discourse. A discourse
embodies knowledge (or, rather, what it defines as knowledge) and therefore it
embodies power. There are rules within a discourse concerning who can make
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statements and in what context, and these rules exclude some and include
others. Those who have knowledge have the power to fix the flow of meaning
and define others. The world is thus made up of a myriad of power relations and
each power is seen to generate a resistance. Numerous authors have
commented that though Foucault postulates that power produces resistance, no
explanation is offered as to why this is so. If power cannot be associated with
repression, as in Lukes' view, the question remains why people would resist.
Sarup, for instance, argues that "Foucault is trapped within a logical 'impasse"',
that "given his conception of power, there can be no escape, no locus of
opposition or resistance, because power itself has no specific basis or ground"
(Ibid. 93).
Foucault leads us into a rarefied philosophical atmosphere in which the world is
seen as created by language and the self is only a "position in language" a mere
"effect of discourse". With attention thus deflected from the search for practical
ways in which to achieve communication, the path is open for a view that all
ways of knowing are exercises in power. Power is "decentered", not the property
of any subject, and because it is normalised, it is routinely practised by subjects
upon themselves insofar as they re-enact the premises of their culture. Although
this grasps a dimension of the modern experience of power, it also obscures the
fact that people can often distinguish between what power is and what it ought to
be. The criteria for distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate power is
made internally impossible, and we are left without a base from which to make
critical judgements. Linda Nicholson, in her analysis of postmodernism, states
this objection, and argues persuasively that "from the correct observation that
truth contains a dimension of power cannot be deduced the claim that truth is
power" (Nicholson in Seidman & Wagner, 1992: 86). Her argument is that power
takes on a variety of forms and "to claim that knowledge is a kind of power is not
to claim that it is identical to that power" (Ibid. 86).
Foucault, consequently, can advocate only resistance, not emancipation. Also,
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the implication that the mutuality of power and knowledge is universal, not just
distinctive to modernity, and that similar analyses can be developed for all
cultures and historical periods, contradicts his theory of historical ruptures. We
need not agree with Foucault that structures of knowledge, epistemes or
paradigms, simply change, succeeding each other without gradual transitions or
the possibility of comparative evaluation. Practical activities bring such
structures into simultaneous use and under some circumstances force
comparative evaluations. Relatedly, we must be careful to avoid the
presumption that discourses are inherently unitary. Competing interpretations
and evaluations may be present within a particular discourse, and these internal
criticisms can be of help to the would-be interpreter. In fact, these internal
criticisms point to the fact that the would-be objects of understanding cannot be
presumed to remain stable and unchanged, a theme that is further explored in
the concluding chapter.
Concluding remarks
In this chapter it has been argued that the Edinburgh School, in their
commitment to naturalistic causal explanation, fails to explain the necessary and
sufficient conditions for scientific beliefs, nor do they present clear explanatory
connections between natural knowledge and social contexts. They argue that
because rational evaluation is indeterminate in all cases, the real causes of
scientific beliefs must be explained in terms of sociological causes such as
interests and forces. The nature of these interests and forces however remains
vague. They do not adequately explain or theorise the process of socialisation
by which scientists supposedly form a common and uniform identity, and by
rejecting the internal perspective of practitioners in science, they overlook an
important source of explanation of scientific practice. Also, the contention that all
beliefs have social causes, and that objectivity is therefore inherently social,
does not hold up to scrutiny. The notion that all belief is caused by social factors
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is self-refuting, and implies a thoroughgoing relativismwhich is not addressed by
merely postulating the principle of reflexivity.
In the case of Latour and Woolgar, it has been argued that they avoid the
thoroughgoing naturalism of the Edinburgh School with a far more reflexive
approach. Their detailed description of the actual practice of science reveals
explanations of unnoticed aspects of everyday scientific activities which often
contradict what scientists themselves believe about their activities. Latour
contends that the Edinburgh School presents an asymmetrical argument
because both society and nature are explained in terms of the social, and
proposes a 'generalised principle of symmetry' which treats both society and
nature symmetrically. Contrary to the Edinburgh School nature is also seen to
shape our beliefs. Though the objectivities of everyday life are seen to be
socially constructed, a non-causal basis for the sociology of science is proposed,
thereby avoiding the interest-based explanations of the 'strong programme'. By
redefining both nature and society as agents in association, and introducing the
concept of quasi-objects, Latour avoids the dilemma of treating constructions as
causes.
Though laboratory studies do present a potentially powerful criticism of our
accepted beliefs regarding scientific knowledge and authority, it is not clear how
we should change our beliefs about science and its practice. More significantly,
in following scientists as they are working, it is not clear what it is that is following
these actors. It has been argued that if the language being used is that of the
researcher, the description then becomes a second-order interpretation of
scientists' constructions, whereas if the description is couched in the language of
the scientists themselves, it loses its critical import. Consequently, it is argued
that Latour and Woolgar can only offer criticism of the practice of natural science
by being selective about the aspects of participants' knowledge to which they
appeal. Though Latour avoids a thoroughgoing constructivist argument, he
nonetheless makes claims along the lines of such an argument by
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conceptualising knowledge claims as power moves.
In the following section a brief explication of liberal and Marxist conceptions of
power is presented, contrasted to Foucault's view of the constitutive role which
power plays in knowledge. Power is seen to both enable and constrain us, and
is thereby a potential transformative social force. The analysis of power is,
however, not done on the level of conscious intention, but on the point of
application of power. This analysis is informed by the notion of the "subject", that
man has a "double character", he both produces knowledge, while
simultaneously being the object of that knowledge through the practices of the
human sciences. Because man is the object of knowledge, questions of
epistemology are treated as questions of social order, as in the case of the
'Edinburgh School' and Latour.
The argument has been that Foucault leaves us in the dark as to how knowledge
is specifically affected by the power which facilitates its production. The slash,
power/knowledge, does not solve the problem. This discrepancy is perhaps best
explained by Steven Seidman, who argues that Foucault emphasises language
and discourse as the agents of knowledge, and consequently, there is an
absence of "any attention to the institutional contexts or social effects of
discourse - in a word, to the interconnection of knowledge and power" (Seidman,
1994: 216). Also obscured in Foucault's analysis, and related to Seidman's
critique, is the fact that people can distinguish between what power is and what it
ought to be, that is, between legitimate and illegitimate power.
Finally, it has been argued that Foucault deflects our attention from the practical
ways in which people achieve communication, and thus conceals the reflexive
manner in which ways of knowing need not exclusively be exercises in power.
One could of course still argue that attentiveness to the effects of power in
shaping all claims to knowledge, is overlooked by people who are not privileged
by power. Steven Phohl states that, regardless of the research methods we
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choose to investigate a given phenomena, "all critical researchers are faced with
an additional task, the challenge of reflexively situating our claims to knowledge
within and against the dominant structures of power, which constitute our present
history" (Phohl, 1994: 470). Phohl thus proposes a power-reflexive
epistemology, "to work within and against the grain of ideological distortions,
rather than pretending that one can float free of ideology altogether" (Ibid. 471).
This power-reflexive epistemology also recognises that knowledge is not a
simple servant of power, that though knowledge may itself become a form of
power, knowledge may also subvert power (Ibid. 409). Power need not
necessarily distort and contaminate our research, for as argued previously,
reciprocal relations of power can be participatory and based on mutual respect.
Respect entails openness and a willingness to listen, which is part of a power-
reflexive approach to research practice. This theme is taken up and further
elaborated in the concluding chapter.
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Chapter 3
The deconstruction of objectivity
The notion of the epistemic symmetry of beliefs introduced by the Edinburgh
School became a central theme of postmodern theory in which the non-
hierarchical nature of knowledge claims is developed into its most radical and
relativistic form. Consequently, in this chapter a brief overview of postmodernist
thought will be presented, followed by a case study of feminist standpoint theory,
in which the methodological implications of a divergence of standpoints rooted in
different experiences are investigated.
Introduction
As noted in the previous chapters, the orthodox consensus and basic
assumptions of a positivist and empiricist model of modern science has come
under attack from a variety of directions. In this regard the impact of
postmodernist theory has been particularly pernicious. Pauline Rosenau, in her
analysis of the impact of postmodernism on the social sciences, lists the
apparent inadequacies of modern science which have been raised by these
critics (Rosenau, 1992: 10). These inadequacies include the failure to produce
the dramatic results promised by enthusiasts; the abuse of modern science by
legitimating the preferences of the powerful; the discrepancy between modern
sciences' theoretical claims and actual practice; the discrepancy between
modern sciences' claim as a solution to all problems and its inability to cope with
the problems of our century; its disregard for the mystical and metaphysical
dimensions of human existence; and lastly, its silence on the ethical and
normative purposes of scientific knowledge (Ibid. 10). As stated by Rosenau, "in
short, postmodernism in the social sciences is, at least in part, a response to the
perceived inadequacies of scientific social science" (Ibid. 10). According to
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Rosenau further points out, postmodernism, like most theoretical strategies, is
not entirely original, and borrows elements from an array of orientations. "It
appropriates, transforms, and transcends French structuralism, romanticism,
phenomenology, nihilism, populism, existentialism, hermeneutics, Western
Marxism, Critical Theory, and anarchism" (Ibid. 13). Out of this array of
borrowings and orientations two methodological approaches can be identified,
"introspective, anti-objectivist interpretation, and deconstruction" (Ibid. 118).
From the foregoing it should be clear that "postmodernism" is an extremely
illusory concept. The evasiveness of postmodernism can perhaps be better
understood by taking note of the postmodernist imperative regarding the finality
of a definition or classification. One of the most important objectives of
postmodernism is the avoidance of final definition or classification through a
continual increase in, and fragmentation and diversification of, discourse. Of
some importance when it comes to understanding postmodernists' antipathy
toward the practice of final definition, is Foucault's conception of power in terms
of the formulation of discourse. What is feared is that the establishment of fixed
and final discursive formations serve to exclude (and victimise) alternative
discursive formations and thereby repress difference.
Another idea that can help one to understand more clearly the postmodernist
dislike of final definition and delineation, is Derrida's notion of "closure", the act
of bringing something to an end. A central theme in the work of Derrida is the
prescription that the attempt at completion, the act of bringing to an end, should
never be allowed to succeed in its goal. Consequently, one can recognise, in
contrast to a strategy of definition or placing within boundaries, a strategy of
continual interpretation. As stated by Ritzer, unlike the structuralists, who saw
order and stability in the language system, "Derrida sees language as disorderly
and unstable. Different contexts give words different meanings" (Ritzer, 1996:
97). It is impossible for scientists to search for the underlying laws of language,
which is the product of 'Iogocentrism', the search for a universal system of
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thought that reveals what is true, and which is the dominant form of Western
social thought. States Ritzer, "Iogocentrism has led to the closure of not only
philosophy, but also of the human sciences", and hence an apt way to describe
Derrida's focus is the "deconstruction of logocentrism" (Ibid. 597).
Derrida and Foucault, however, never proclaimed themselves postmodernists.
As argued by Calhoun, "the structuralist background to poststructuralist theory is
widely forgotten or misunderstood", and "we need to avoid exaggerating any
emphasis on the prefix "post" and recognise the extent to which Derrida and
especially Foucault write as inheritors of structuralism" (Calhoun, 1995: 99). For
the purposes of this chapter, however, Derrida and Foucault are treated as
precursors to post-modern theory due to the pervasive influence of the concepts
'discourse' and 'differánce' on this mode of inquiry.
A further difficulty is that 'postmodernism' and 'poststructuralism' are often
conflated and treated as equivalent. The difference between the two is,
according to Rosenau, "one of emphasis more than substance: postmodernists
are more oriented toward cultural critique while the poststructuralists emphasise
method and epistemological matters" (Rosenau, 1992: 3). Due to the constraints
of a single chapter this useful distinction is not maintained in this exposition.
Lastly, it is also worth noting that the difficulties of the postmodern concept are
further confounded by the fact that the arguments of more conventional critics of
modern social science are interwoven with those of postmodern theorists, which
make clear demarcations problematic (Ibid. 5).
Postmodernism
For our purposes it is enough to note that this emphasis on diversification and
fragmentation, the focus on difference, and the concomitant deferral of final
meaning, are all meant to refute the so called metanarratives which are
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perceived to be an integral part of modernism. As is well known, the concept of
metanarratives was introduced by Jean-Francois Lyotard who defined
postmodernism as "incredulity toward metanarratives" (Tarnas, 1991: 401).
Metanarratives can be described as discourses in terms of which it is claimed
that truth, knowledge and objectivity exist independently of historical social
practices and other contextual factors. As in the case of the sociology of
science, the attack on metanarratives therefore translates into a rejection of the
idea that the scientific method is instrumental to the discovery of truths
independent of the scientist and the scientific method.
In common with Foucault, postmodernists react to the modernist epistemological
position by arguing that truth flows from discourse. Each discourse contains
rules and procedures which themselves demarcate what can be said to be
meaningful and true. From a postmodernist perspective one can argue that the
different discourses are not regulated by certain over-arching (transcendent)
rules and that, as a result of this lack of over-arching authority, the truth claims
made by opposing discourses are in principle beyond adjudication, or
incommensurable in the language of Peter Winch. The settling of disputes are
possible only through prior agreement on the rules, and cannot be enforced by a
specifically positioned group or person purporting to have unlocked certain
objective and universal truths.
Postmodernism, then, requires all attempts at the legitimation of knowledge
claims to take a very local and plural form (Fraser & Nicholson, 1990: 23). This
idea of local and plural legitimation of knowledge is, however, criticised by
authors who argue that these local legitimations are already informed by larger
inequalities and that these local legitimations can, therefore, lead to the
exacerbation and further entrenchment of larger inequalities.
It is, on the one hand, possible to think of postmodernism in terms of a new
social reality, an epochal change, which has the effect of displacing (even
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replacing) the previously predominant modern reality. Claims along these lines
identify central themes of modern social reality such as communication by
means of the printed word, colonialism, capitalism, an emphasis on work etc. In
contrast, post-modern reality is characterised by electronic means of
communication, relaxation, the consumption of resources, an emphasis on
human relationships etc. From the local vantagepoint of someone living in rural
Africa, I want to question the notion of dramatic social and cultural changes that
are a radical departure from previous trends. Though, as Calhoun argues, these
changes are real and major, they do not appear to amount to an epochal break
(Calhoun, 1995: 99). The two basic organising forces in modernity, capitalism
and bureaucratic power, have hardly began to dissolve. Also, as stated by
Calhoun, "the problems of self and agency are neither new to the post-modern
era nor obsolete because superseded either historically or theoretically; these
problems continue to shape our lives and thought as they have shaped them
throughout modernity" (Ibid. 99). I would support Calhoun's contention that to
use the prefix 'post' is to narrow our notion of the modern. Rather, the insights of
postmodernist thinkers could be incorporated into a richer sociological approach
to the entire modern era (Ibid. 99).
The focus of this thesis is, however, not primarily on theories of society or social
reality but on theories of knowledge and method. Accordingly I will briefly
compare what has come to be known as modern and postmodern forms of
knowledge. Although presented as dichotomies, the differences often fall along
a continuum. A considerable amount of literature from those who are committed
to the modernist approach is of a defensive sort when confronted with the
epistemological directions advocated by postmodernist analysis. The tactic is
generally to dismiss postmodern claims regarding knowledge as old wine in new
bottles, followed by an incorporation of the postmodern concepts within the
discourse of modernist thought.
Taking their cue from Derrida, postmodernists argue that modernist thought has
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its roots in the Enlightenment and tended toward a totalising truth centred on an
ostensibly discoverable logos. Driven by uniform and formal rational methods,
one dominant and globalising thought emerges, and narrative knowledge is seen
to be usurped by scientific knowledge. The search for truth by the modernists is
guided by the ideal of establishing absolute postulates from which all other 'facts'
can be explained by linear, deductive logic. Narrative knowledge, on the other
hand, is based on myth, legend, tales, stories etc., which provide the wherewithal
of being in society. Whereas scientific knowledge tends toward closure,
narrative knowledge embraces imaginary free play. For postmodernists,
knowledge is always both relational and positional. Accordingly, standpoints are
always situated in social relations and within ideologies. In line with Foucault,
power and knowledge are intricately connected and hierarchically arranged. To
enter a 'discursive formation' (whether legal, medical, scientific, political etc.) is to
enter the logic and rationality embedded within it, or, as Foucault would reiterate,
truth is always discourse specific.
Useful in this regard is the analysis of Seidman and Wagner (1992: 1-14), who
trace the development of social theory, and how questions regarding the
epistemological, political, and moral status of the social sciences have been
contested since the inception of the social sciences. During the 1960's and
1970's the dominant positivism of the social sciences came under severe
criticism. The critics argued that
"the natural and social sciences involve an interpretative ordering
of social reality; that philosophical, aesthetic, and moral
considerations play a role in all empirical inquiry; and that in its
resistance to empirical verification science resembles literary
interpretation" (Ibid. 1).
These critics of positivism, though agreeing on certain points, disagreed on other
fundamental issues. Some critics, though rejecting the positivist model of the
social sciences, nonetheless did not challenge the 'eplstemlc privileging' of
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science. Other critics, especially poststructuralists, challenged both the
scientism of positivists and the scientism of their critics. These critics
emphasised the social and historical embeddedness of all inquiry, as well as the
undesirability of a unified social scientific paradigm. Consequently a new
division developed between those who "defended the pos'sibility and desirability
of achieving secure analytical foundations - 'modernists' - and critics of this
project" (Ibid. 2). The central concern of the critics of this project, the
postmodernists, is the consideration of "the relationship between scientific
knowledge, power, and society as well as the relation between science, critique,
and narrative" (Ibid. 2).
Postmodernism, in common with Critical Theory, criticises the Weberian notion
that science is or should be value-neutral, and emphasises the practical and
moral meaning of science. Steven Seidman (1992: 47-81) argues for a radical
decentering of science and proposes that "social scientific knowledge bears the
imprint not only of the broad civilisational and national culture of which it is a part
but typically of the more specific class, race, gender, or sexual orientation of its
producers" (Ibid. 6). The attempt of any author to advance a general theoretical
standpoint is deconstructed, that is, reveals the particular standpoint and
interests of its author in its basic concepts and explanations. Seidman, for
example, argues that the conceptual framework of Marxism exhibits the
standpoint of, and bias of, a white European, middle-class heterosexual male.
"A general theory of society and history that is centred on economically based
class dynamics neglects and marginalises social and political dynamics that
revolve around gender, ethnicity, race, sexuality, or age" (Ibid. 7). In the tradition
of Foucault, what Marx does not say therefore takes on as much, if not greater
importance, than what he does in fact say.
Charles Lemert (see Seidman, 1992: 17-46), argues that the distinction between
"a social theory and a sociological theory is that between a readiness to place
politics ahead of epistemology as the foundation for thinking and an insistence
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that knowledge (including a theory of knowledge) always necessarily precedes
and informs statement about the social world" (Ibid. 34). Social theory is
therefore seen to begin with a political position of some sort rather than an
epistemology. Lemert asserts that the concept of "difference" is "the most
powerful social theoretical concept in the poststructuralist vocabulary", and one
that is "the most explicitly political" (Ibid. 35). As in the case of Foucault he
advocates a decentering of the intellectual and political world in order "to
experience and understand the differences of social reality - differences
experienced most acutely by those in the excluded positions in Western society:
women, homosexuals, the poor, the working class, nonwhites, and third world"
(Ibid. 39). Consequently this critique becomes a critique of essentialism, that if
there is an essential truth then there is only one truth, and that truth is the
controlling truth of the dominant class. The claim to truth, as in the case of
Foucault, becomes an act of power, that is, the will to form humanity. As stated
by Seidman, "this epistemic suspicion is at the core of postmodernism" (Ibid. 68).
Seidman concedes that postmodernism leaves many questions unanswered, in
particular the specter of relativism, but argues that this course is preferable to
"the repression of difference and diversity that is implied in the quest for
foundations and disciplinary order" (Ibid. 75). This choice is unashamedly
political and partial, and implies a choice between polar opposites. In common
with various other commentators I would like to argue for an intermediate
position between modernism and postmodernism, which will form part of the
concluding chapter of this thesis. First I want to address the methodological
implications of the recognition of a divergence of standpoints rooted in different
experiences.
One of the implications of postmodernist theory and the emphasis on the plurality
of different perspectives on the world is that instead of evaluating knowledge we
should explore its social origins. As stated by Jeffrey Alexander in his analysis of
the postmodernism of Richard Rorty, "rather than criticising society in light of
universalist norms, we should criticise universalist norms in light of their social
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base (Alexander in Seidman & Wagner, 1992:343). It is in feminist theory that a
version of standpoint theory has become most developed, and is therefore most
conducive as a case study and explication of methodological considerations.
Feminism shares with postmodernism a critique of universalism through its
exposure or deconstruction of universal thinking as male-centred. It is,
however, worth noting, and as stated by Pauline Rosenau, "that feminist
postmodernists are ambivalent about postmodern relativism and anti-objectivism,
especially when discussion turns to their own particular group" (Rosenau, 1992:
15).
A methodological investigation of standpoint theory
The great Enlightenment thinkers praised universalism as one of the premier
intellectual virtues. But they did not claim to have achieved perfect universalism,
rather, they claimed to move in that direction. This was the direction of progress,
and meant a continual overcoming of partiality. Within this logic of increasing
universality, one could not say with pride that one was partial (see Calhoun
(1995: 162-166). Calhoun identifies two primary origins from which the critique of
a universal standpoint developed. One direction was in relation to Marx, who
sought to show that the man taken as universal by philosophers of individual
rights was only bourgeois man, man as citizen, but not man as worker. One
feature of Marx's proletariat, however, was that, though it claimed to be all
encompassing, it seemed in fact to be primarily male. Like the category of
citizen, it was a false universal, a genderless term which hid the gender bias of
its construction.
The second lineage of standpoint theory identified by Calhoun descended from
Hegel who challenged the ahistorical character of Kant's philosophy. This is
illustrated by Hegel's famous dialogue of master and slave. Hegel suggested
that while the master's standpoint offered an illusory autonomy, it was in fact
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both distorted and dependent on the recognition of the slave. Some
philosophers, following Hegel, argued that "a greater perspicacity, though not
quite an objectivity, was offered by the standpoint of the oppressed subordinate"
(Ibid. 164). The slave is given a special claim to universality by the very nature
of the slave's experience of oppression. A variety of other thinkers have taken
up Hegel's dialectic of master and slave in a similar radical spirit, but it is in
feminist theory that this version of standpoint theory has become most
developed.
Feminism shares with postmodernism a critique of the universalism inherent in
modern social and political thought through its exposure of universal thinking as
male-centred. From the late 1970's, however, an internal debate arose within
feminist thought, when black feminists challenged the universal pretensions
inherent in feminist's own notions of sisterhood. The black feminist critique of
white feminism emerged to accuse white middle-class feminists of
ethnocentrism, racism, and of the selfsame errors of which they accused men,
that is, that they generalised and theorised from their own situation. As stated by
Terry Lovell (see Turner, 1996: 307), "this critique has reverberated through
feminism in the past 15 years. Conjoined with post-feminist 'gender-scepticism',
it has threatened to deconstruct the concepts on which contemporary feminism
seemed to depend: 'woman', 'women', 'gender'." As a result a shift took place in
feminist thinking, and it was proposed that the basis of women's political identity
was not so much rooted in women's shared oppression by men but in women's
shared identity as different from men. It marked, in other words, a shift towards
political identity rooted in difference. The main point is that black feminists raised
the need to acknowledge that the category 'woman' is itself differentiated by
class, race, ethnicity, disability, sexuality, age, etc. As stated by Craig Calhoun
(1995: 168), lithe very construction of a women's standpoint, thus, not only relies
on the distinctive experience of women but on the creation of an abstract
category of women that is not given by that experience but by theory. II
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This critique from the diversity of women's positions in society and
representations in culture has meant that the feminist analysis of women and
gender must be different, and that this is not a simple matter of adding on a
consideration of race or other dimensions of difference between women. Terry
Lovell states that "the point is well taken that gender, class, and race are not
discrete and cumulative forms of oppression, but that gender is constructed in
and through differences of race and class, and vice versa" (Ibid. 310). This
challenge from diversity has taken contemporary feminist theory into the heart of
the most intractable questions on the nature of knowledge itself.
The basic argument has to do with the relationship between epistemological
standpoint and experience. The gulf between male and female experiences is
seen to be unbridgeable, and the differences incommensurable. Increasingly,
the term standpoint came to denote not the search for a standpoint capable of
offering universal understanding, but recognition of the divergence of standpoints
rooted in different experiences.
The origins of standpoint theory thus lie within the critical theory tradition and its
recognition that all research is inherently political. What has influenced the
methodology of feminists most directly is critical theory's emphasis on
problematising the view of the researcher as objective and value-free. As
Harding emphasises, "there is no such thing as a problem without a person (or
groups of them) who have a problem: a problem is always a problem for
someone or other" (Ibid. 7). The requirement that social research be 'objective'
and 'value-free' has had the effect of shifting the spotlight away from the
researchers themselves and their own subjective and value-laden perspectives,
and has focused it, instead, exclusively upon the adequacy and accuracy of the
methods used by the researcher, from the 'context of discovery', as Harding
terms it, to the 'context of justification' (Ibid. 7).
The central, agenda-setting role of researchers in their ability to decide what is,
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and is not, worthy of research has thus been largely ignored and defined away
as an issue. Concepts such as 'objectivity' and 'value-neutrality' provided the
necessary ideological apparatus to ensure that not only is such a patriarchal and
bourgeois agenda unchallengeable, but also, if an alternative perspective was
offered - whether anti-racist or feminist, for instance - then it could be simply
dismissed as politically biased, subjective, and thus, ultimately, unscientific. If all
research is inherently political by nature then, it has been argued, this needs to
be fully acknowledged by researchers who would place their own subjectivity and
value assumptions, as Harding contends, in the "same critical plane as the overt
subject matter" so as to recover the "entire research process for scrutiny in the
results of the research" (Ibid. 9).
The contention is further that it is impossible to eliminate the male-dominated or
androcentric biases from social research simply by use of the scientific method,
especially when, as Harding maintains, "androcentrism arrives in the inquiry
process through the identification and definition of the research problems" (Ibid.
184). The only way forward in the circumstances is thus to found (root) this
process of identification and definition in women's experiences. Moreover, it is
argued that this privileging of women's experiences over men's should not be
regarded as a move towards relativism. Men and women's experiences do not
provide equal bases for developing scientific problems. This is because the
activities of men, as Harding explains, "shape the horizons of their knowledge
and support interests in ignorance of the misery generated by the domination of
women" (Ibid. 186).
Very similar arguments privileging the experiences and epistemological
standpoint of black people have also been put forward by writers within the anti-
racist tradition (Hooks, 1982). It is, however, important to point to the difference
of emphasis between feminist and anti-racist methodology. It is a difference that
can be understood in the different ways in which women and black people have
been treated in the research process. Women have been rendered invisible,
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whereas black people have been rendered problematic, via comparison with the
white middle-class norm, in terms of for instance, their 'deviant' family structures.
While anti-racist writers have therefore been largely concerned with challenging
the dominant mode of race research, feminist writers have been more concerned
with rendering women visible. Not surprisingly, therefore, whilst anti-racists have
been raising questions more about what is being researched and why, a number
of feminist writers have been more concerned with who should be doing the
research.
As pointed out by Paul Connolly in an essay on standpoint epistemology, the
importance of this work in challenging our very claims to knowledge cannot be
underestimated (Connolly in Lyon & Busfield, 1996: 185-197). Indeed, they have
raised a number of central epistemological questions that are pertinent to the
topic of this thesis. However, as has been pointed out by a number of
commentators, such arguments also encounter a number of important and
fundamental problems. The first relates to the simple division between women
and men and the essentialist notion of women's shared experience. Connolly
argues that the problems emerging from this can be illustrated through the use of
a rather simple question: who would be best able to research black women, a
white woman or a black man? Would one opt for a white woman due to their
common experience as women, or would a black male researcher have an equal
understanding of her experiences by virtue of a shared experience of racism. My
experience would suggest that gender is a more basic category than race, but
this assumption does not alter the fact that both the white woman's and black
man's prior insight and shared experience can only ever be partial. This would
imply on a practical level that the goal of 'symmetry' between researcher and
participants would render large areas of research impossible. In similar vein,
some feminist commentators have argued that men should focus on masculinity
and, whilst they should support and ensure that their work is informed by feminist
theory, they are neither in a position to, nor should be critical of, or engage with,
feminist theory. This argument of course raises more problems than it solves. It
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makes little sense to study masculinity without reference to women. Also, as
pointed out by Connolly, there is an inherent contradiction within the logic that
men should support feminist theory and ensure that it informs their work whilst
not critically engaging with it. Feminismcontains a wide range of competing, and
at times incompatible, critical thought. It requires that an assessment and value-
judgement be made regarding which strand of feminist thought is to be
supported, which in turn demands a critical engagement with feminism (Ibid.
193).
At the heart of these problems, therefore, are essentialist notions of experience.
Such a claim, however, involves a strong assertion regarding the uniformity of
members of a collectivity. States Calhoun, "to base this claim on what is shared
in experience is to court refutation from an infinitely ramifying range of
experiences" (Calhoun, 1995: 166). Or, as stated by Susan Bordo (see Turner,
1996: 336) in her criticism of post-modernist feminism, postmodernism has
substituted "the view from nowhere of traditional objectivist science" with "an
equally imaginary view from everywhere". Other feminist writers who advocate
a standpoint epistemology have consequently focused more closely on what
counts as 'experience', and have moved toward the anti-racist focus on the what
and why of research rather than simply on who is doing the research.
It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that standpoint epistemology has
raised fundamental questions about the value-neutrality of social research and
it's associated claims to objectivity. There can be no doubt that a researcher's
social identity will affect the way in which people relate to her or him in the field.
On a practical level though, it is no more than a simple truism that certain social
settings are more accessible to certain researchers than others are. For
standpoint theorists this is, however, not the issue at hand. For them the
question is whether men should engage in critical social research on gender at
all. In line with Connolly it is my contention that as reflexive beings we are
capable of empathy and critical reflection, and are able to learn from and
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incorporate the experiences of others into our research. This leads to the simple
conclusion that it is more important to be concerned with what a researcher is
doing and why, than with whom they are. Our actions rather than our social
identity are what is of most importance (Connolly in Lyon & Busfield, 1996: 185-
197).
A further branching in what Calhoun refers to as the 'standpoint family tree',
produces the argument that it is meaningless to give priority to any particular
standpoint. Says Calhoun, "does not human life admit to, indeed necessarily
produce, innumerable standpoints?" (lbid.166). This postmodernist-influenced
line of argument is that it is necessary to forego the attempt at universalisation,
even such partial universalisations as the standpoint of women. Charles Lemert
summarises this succinctly by stating that those "who dispute the feminist
standpoint theory do so because it remains essentialist, simply substituting for
the critiqued cultural models of masculinity equally universal ideals for
knowledge, social relations, and moral development" (Seidman & Wagner, 1992:
39).
In this view the essentialist, centred, and universal model of standpoint theory
remains modernist. Its approach does not take the very difference that it cites as
the rationale for its methodology seriously. Feminist standpoint theory has
attempted to address this critique from diversity, but, as argued by Terry Lovell
(see Turner, 1996: 336), "although the term most often used is 'feminist
standpoint' there is an elision in much of this writing between 'feminist' and
'women', a gap which is papered over by the assumption that to be a feminist is
precisely 'to take the standpoint of women'. But the critique from diversity
instantly forces us to ask 'which women?' Women do not all share the same
interests; indeed sometimes their interests may be directly opposed." Can
groups whose political identities are rooted in their difference move beyond their
own specific interests? As Lovell (Ibid. 337) writes,
"what is to stop the slide from 'standpoints' to a familiar
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individualistic liberal pluralism, which is where much postmodernist
thought has ended? Even postmodernists continue, de facto, to
take soundings in terms of 'race', class, gender, and ethnicity.
Does this not suggest that, after all, these are the major structuring
dimensions of the contemporary world? Does this discredit
'poststructuralism'?"
Concluding remarks
Contrary to this post-modernist influenced feminist position, with its emphasis on
difference, and which equates science with discourse, one could argue that the
contribution of female scientists was that, though they see different things, they
do not see them on fundamentally different foundations of reason and
observation. As argued in the previous chapter, recognising the extent to which
science is a collective enterprise pursued largely through discourse, need not
mean that science be reduced to just discourse, or just empirical observation and
rational deduction. Interpersonal relationships are not only sources of bias, but
also sources of common understanding.
According to Calhoun, "there is not necessarily a sharp and mutually exclusive
opposition between taking seriously the notion of science as conversation and
recognising that reason and observation have a role to play in knowledge"
(Cahoun, 1995: 177). Calhoun contends that the postmodern view of discourse
is presented as though it proves that the notion of truth based on a foundational
observation and deduction are false, whereas it should rather be seen as a
qualification and relativisation of such claims. The notion of conversation as
arbitrary, as more or less interesting, rather than as a practical means of gaining
consensus on the validation of knowledge, "recognises no history of concrete
social practices that encourage mutual understanding and even epistemic gain"
(Ibid. 178).
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A feminist voice that reminds us of the social nature of scientific practice is of
course itself an interested voice within science, not just a reversal of the
interestedness of male-dominated science, yet this does not mean that science
must cease to seek better ways of understanding because it admits to partiality
and interest. As stated by Calhoun, "it misses the possibilities opened by
Gadamer's rejection of both finalistic and historicist hermeneutics in favour of an
account of judgement enabling us to move from a worse to a better position
(within some practical frame of reference) without claiming essential truth" (Ibid.
180). It is this practical dimension which encourages a more historically situated
approach to knowledge without yielding to a debilitating relativism. As stated by
John Mandalios (see Turner, 1996: 280),
"historical understanding enables individuals to reflect upon the
historicity, as against naturalism, of a given concrete practice or
institution. To understand that the order of things differs according
to place (culture) and time (historical juncture) is to adopt a more
reflexive stance toward the social world and its investigation. 5elf-
reflexivity and historical consciousness, it might be said, go hand in
hand".
The challenge, therefore, is to chart a new course between the classical and
modern overdetermination of rationality, and the dissolution of the rational
subject in postmodern thought. This line of investigation will be explicated in the
following and final chapter. First I would like to make some general remarks
about the paradoxical position adopted by "postmodernists".
Postmodernism has generated a new object, namely "modernism". Under this
label the whole vast sweep of Western thought since the Enlightenment has
been compressed. As RichardTarnas (1991: 401) writes,
"postmodernism in this sense is an antinomian movement that
assumes a vast unmasking in the Western mind
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Deconstruction, decentering, disappearance, dissemination,
demystification, discontinuity, difference, dispersion, etc. Such
terms express an epistemological obsession with fragments or
fractures, and a corresponding ideological commitment to
minorities in politics, sex and language".
To assert a general truth is at best to claim a temporarily useful fiction and at
worst an oppressive fiction masking relationships of power, violence and
subordination. In consequence there is no postmodern worldview, nor the
possibility of one. Postmodernism, as implied by Lyotard's famous "incredulity
towards metanarratives", is fundamentally subversive of all paradigms, except,
paradoxically, the superiority of its own perspective.
According to Tarnas (1991: 401), "the postmodern mind's sense of superiority
derives from its special awareness of how little knowledge can be claimed by any
mind, itself included". Ironically postmodernism cannot justify itself on its own
terms and must be regarded as but one more perspective having no necessarily
universal value. Tarnas aptly points out that "implicitly, the one postmodern
absolute is critical consciousness, which, by deconstructing all, seems compelled
by its own logic to do so to itself as well" (Ibid. 402).
While postmodernism contributes to our knowledge through its emphasis on the
plurality of different perspectives on the world, and the diversity of that world, it
moves far too easily from a recognition of the various obstacles to obtaining
accurate knowledge to the claim that we cannot make comparative judgements
about the quality of different knowledge claims. One could argue that the
problems involved in the verification of social knowledge are not as
insurmountable as postmodernists would have us believe, but that they draw our
attention to how "modernists" have underestimated these problems. In this
regard Rob Stones (1996: 2) states that "defeatist postmodernists decry any
notion of realism, while sociological modernists work, implicitly or explicitly, with
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a crude form of realism in which the reality of the social world is all too
unproblematically apparent to the favoured theoretical framework, whether this
be Marxism, functionalism, modernisation theory, systems theory or whatever.
In these latter cases, far too much of the burden of proof is placed upon the
theoretical framework, to the detriment of an adequate stock of empirical
knowledge". The point that Stones is making is that whereas modernists
typically present "facts" as if they speak for themselves, postmodernists too
easily move from the recognition that reality cannot be directly represented to the
invalid claim that reality cannot therefore be represented at all.
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Chapter 4
Critical social science as dialogue with practical intent
In this chapter an attempt is made to chart a course between inflexible positivism
and debilitating relativism by drawing on the postpositivist theorising of Jeffrey
Alexander and the Critical Theory of Thomas McCarthy and Craig Calhoun, with
specific reference to their interpretation of the work of Jurgen Habermas.
Particular attention is paid to the problem of cultural difference and the political
dimension of social sciences research, and tentative conclusions regarding the
status of objectivity in the social sciences are drawn.
Introduction
Critical theory has attempted to bridge the gap that has been central to
conventional positivism, namely between facts and values. Bryan S. Turner
(1996: 12) argues that "it has been a significant but tragic and misguided reading
of Weber's philosophy of social science to suggest that value freedom implies
that the social theorist can have no political engagement. In fact Weber's notion
of value freedom was primarily a warning against the abuse of office and
privilege; it was a criticism of university professors, namely that they should not
preach from the lecture hall as though their political opinions were neutral facts
about the world". In this interpretation the work of Weber can then be seen as a
precursor to the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt theorists. It is important to state
that though these theorists played a crucial role in the development of Critical
Theory, this mode of analysis, as noted by Craig Calhoun (see Turner (ed.),
1996: 462), "is carried on not just by Habermas and his associates, but by a wide
range of others working in varying approaches: feminist theorists,
poststructuralists, theorists of practice, etc."
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In the previous chapters it has been argued that the empiricist approaches to
epistemology such as that of Kuhn, the Edinburgh School, and Latour,
impoverish their analyses by ignoring normative prescriptions for the conduct of
science. Likewise the discourse analyses of post-modern theorists impoverish
their explanations through an external critique, failing to recognise that
discourses are not unitary, and that internal criticisms are part of the normative
practice of science and raise issues among scientists of the empirical adequacy
of theories. However, as Max Weber pointed out, empirical evidence must be
framed in terms of meaning, which in turn raises the problem of the interpretation
of meaning.
Interpretation has been understood by positivists as implying purely subjective
intuition or empathy, that is, a practice of acquiring knowledge without controls or
correctives. Critics of the post-modern persuasion have, on the other hand,
denied that objectivity of any sort is possible, or that it is at best an arbitrary
convention. Contrary to these two extremes Max Weber argues for an
intermediary position, where objectivity does not mean that the social scientist
reports on facts that are 'out there', but adopts a conceptual scheme which is in
a dialectical relationship with empirical data. To cite Weber's social,
psychological and other extra-scientific 'interests' is to fail to recognise that his
concepts have generated a vast assemblage of hypotheses used by scientists
who did not share Weber's extra-scientific concerns. As stated by Berger and
Kellner, "the question of whether the famous 'Protestant ethic thesis' is or is not
objectively valid as an interpretation of certain facets of modern history cannot be
decided as a result of any amount of delving into Weber's biography or psyche"
(1981: 54).
Sociology of course cannot escape from the historicity of social forms in which
meanings are embodied. Nor can the sociologist 'suspend' the values that are
part and parcel of this historical situatedness. Such 'suspension' can also not be
guaranteed by rigorous research methods, which can themselves be influenced
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by values. Consequently critics of the social sciences have often maintained that
social science is by its very nature subjective, and whereas the natural sciences
produce objective knowledge, the social sciences are biased and unreliable.
This argument is based on the thesis that values and interests uniquely influence
social scientific inquiry. In this regard Weber presents a classical point of
reference on the objectivity of the social sciences, attempting to bridge the divide
between those who believe we should attempt to follow the path of the natural
sciences, and those who conceive the study of people as being an entirely
distinct mode of inquiry. Weber concedes that all knowledge of concrete social
reality is from particular points of view, yet argues that this need not render
objective knowledge impossible.
We have also seen how the Edinburgh School, in their commitment to
naturalistic causal explanation, tries to explain the necessary and sufficient
conditions for scientific belief. They argue that rational evaluation is
indeterminate in all cases, and that the real causes of scientific beliefs must
hence be explained in terms of sociological causes such as interests and forces.
It has been argued that because they do not formulate the process of
socialisation by which scientists supposedly form a common and uniform identity,
the nature of these interests and forces remains vague. By overlooking the
internal normative perspective of practitioners in science, they overlook an
important source of explanation of scientific practice.
Latour, in turn, contends that the Edinburgh School presents an asymmetrical
argument because both society and nature are explained in terms of the social,
and proposes that we treat both society and nature symmetrically. Contrary to
the Edinburgh School nature is also seen to shape our beliefs. Latour proposes
a non-causal basis for the sociology of science, avoiding the problems of
interest-based explanations, and the dilemma of treating constructions as
causes.
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It has been argued that Latour's work is illustrative of how the techniques of
anthropological observation are being used more and more by modern science
on itself. This research shows that people are often unaware of their behaviour
and motivation, as they are themselves frequently surprised by this behaviour
when they are questioned about why they said or did certain things. States
David Hoy, "the genealogist thus tries to see as strange what the culture takes to
be familiar" (Hoy and McCarthy, 1995: 174). This method of observation is a
fragile combination of experiential nearness and analytical distance, and though
laboratory studies do present a potentially powerful criticism of our accepted
beliefs regarding scientific knowledge and authority, in the case of ethnographic
laboratory studies, it is not clear how we should change our beliefs about science
and its practice. More significantly, in following scientists as they are working, it
is not clear what it is that is following these actors. If the language used is that of
the researcher, the description becomes a second-order interpretation, whereas
if the language used is that of the scientists themselves, it loses its critical import.
Also, as argued by Thomas McCarthy, "detailed descriptions need not
undermine what they depict, they may as well show that the respect accorded
certain reputedly rational practices is in fact deserved" (Ibid. 82). McCarthy
proposes that such studies have a dual potential for corroboration and critique,
and that
"reconstructed rule systems can turn out, as they do in Foucault's
archaeological investigations, to be contingent, arbitrary,
transformable singularities; or they can turn out, as they do in
Habermas' pragmatic analyses of communication, to be enabling
conditions of basic practices to which there are no good
alternatives" (Ibid. 83).
The point McCarthy is making is that there is nothing in the methods of
ethnographic description, as such, that dictates from the start whether
descriptions of lived practices will lead to their rational reconstruction or their
critical deconstruction. Consequently, Latour and Woolgar can only offer
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criticism of the practice of natural science by being selective about the aspects of
participants' knowledge to which they appeal. States McCarthy, "one would
expect that the most convincing accounts will sometimes be stories of gain,
sometimes stories of loss, but mostly stories of both - as were, indeed the
classical social-theoretical accounts of the emergence of the modern world as a
whole" (Ibid. 83).
By treating society and nature symmetrically, and introducing the concept of
quasi-objects, Latour avoids a thoroughgoing constructivist argument, though he
nonetheless makes claims along the lines of such an argument by
conceptualising knowledge claims as power moves. As in the case of Foucault,
questions of epistemology are treated as questions of social order, and hence
point to a politics of truth. This leads to an argument in which the individual is
represented as thoroughly submerged in some whole, whether language,
culture, history, or power. Understanding knowledge becomes a matter of
understanding the social practices in which we justify beliefs.
Donna Haraway states that "the temptations of a social constructionist
framework lie in its contention that all knowledge claims, most certainly and
especially scientific ones, are to be theorised as power moves, not moves
towards truth" (Phohl, 1994: 388). While sympathetic to this temptation Haraway
is concerned that this perspective offers no "objectively defendable or ethically
scientific position from which to question existing structures of power" (Ibid. 388).
Without denying the situated character of knowledge, which links constructionism
to other critical viewpoints, Haraway supplements its theoretical claims with
those of "feminist critical empiricism". As seen in the previous chapter this is a
claim to "embodied objectivity" or the "experiential standpoint" of women and
other disadvantaged groups. The claim is not that the standpoint of the
oppressed is without distortions, but that an attentiveness to the effects of power
in shaping all claims to knowledge, is overlooked by people who are most
privileged by power. This is what gives the constructions of the oppressed their
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partial objectivity, the awareness of the interdependence between power and
knowledge. As Stephen Phohl writes, situated objectivity is "a methodological
move away from all purely scientific doctrines", and "demands that
constructionists be as reflexive about the contexts of their own theoretical
activities as they are about the claims of the people they study" (Ibid. 389).
Researchers, like anyone else, are bound to the social context in which their
studies occur. In interpreting the interpretations of others, researchers must rely
on the same interpretative practices as everyday people. How, then, can they
claim objectivity for their analyses? Constructionists acknowledge that objectivity
is partial, at best, but attempt to approximate objectivity by providing a detailed
account of the natural history of the research, taking the social context and
context-bound interpretative decisions into account. The strength of this
approach is that it does not retreat into the scientific haven of survey analysis or
forced-choice questionnaires. In this regard Phohl states, "these methods may
be useful, but they also depend upon interpretative inferences and context-
bound judgements about what is or isn't a meaningful answer to a pre-packaged
question" (Ibid. 365). Phohl's argument is that the use of such allegedly
objective research instruments presents as many interpretative problems as
those raised in the course of ethnographic fieldwork. The suggestion is made
that in order to approximate objectivity, attempts should be made to partially
replicate a particular study. By repeating a particular investigation in some other
context, we can approach research in a comparative fashion, highlighting
similarities and differences in the findings, and may better understand and
transcend the social factors that limit objectivity.
Constructionist and deconstructionist arguments rest on the assumption that the
practices of cultures or discourses are inherently unitary, and not subject to
competing interpretations and internal critiques. As argued previously,
recognising the extent to which science is a collective enterprise pursued largely
through discourse, need not mean that science be reduced to just discourse.
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Interpersonal relationships are not only a source of bias, but also sources of
common understanding. States Thomas McCarthy, "the role of warranting and
contesting reasons is in turn tied to the ability of competent subjects to accept
and reject them, to weigh and revise them, to originate and criticise them" (Ibid.
37). McCarthy argues that it is this ability which is lost from sight, and that
"accountable agents get transformed into cultural dopes, nodal points in grids of
power, effects of the play of difference" (Ibid. 37). In line with Habermas he
argues that the potential for uncoerced agreement on the basis of reasons open
to intersubjective assessment gets downgraded. Consequently exclusively
deconstructionist approaches surprisingly fail to acknowledge that knowledge
has both the potential to be dogmatic and subversive. McCarthy argues that if
we adopt a more pragmatic approach, "we can appreciate both aspects of ideas
of reason: their potential for misuse and their irreplaceable function in co-
operative social interaction" (Ibid. 37).
It is, however, no longer just that there are doubts as to whether the social
sciences can be more like the traditional conception of natural science, it is
widely recognised that the natural sciences are more deeply culturally,
theoretically, and institutionally constructed than traditional and textbook
accounts of science have suggested. Consequently, the social sciences can be
conceived as practical and value-related in quite a different sense than argued
by Weber, that is, practical in the technical sense that its explanations supply
better means to solve problems. This stronger notion of the critical and practical
purposes of social science goes beyond the much more limited conception of
Weber who conceived criticism as theory-laden and theory-dependent, and thus
as a limit on what social science can do. It is now acknowledged that natural
science must confront the very same problems posed by the cultural and
theoretical embeddedness of scientific practice. In line with Habermas, the
concept of norms, not values, is consequently proposed as the proper way to
characterise the practices of both social and natural scientists, as "it points to the
structuring of social encounters by shared knowledge, expectations, and rules"
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(Bohman, 1991: 190). Criticism, in this view, becomes an act of communication,
a way of improving things not by controlling a domain of phenomena, but by
changing beliefs and attitudes.
The problem of cultural difference
The modern/post-modern debate echoes the inconclusive rationality/relativism
debate that centred on Peter Winch's interpretation of Wittgenstein and the
problems of cross-cultural understanding. One of the virtues of the work of
Foucault, Derrida, and a number of postmodernist theorists, has been to
introduce the importance of difference. Craig Calhoun, in a chapter entitled
"Cultural Difference and Historical Specificity" develops the argument that we
need to be attentive to problems of cultural difference in a way that social
theorists seldom have been (Calhoun, 1995: 70-96). By this Calhoun does not
mean simply seeing theories as embedded in cultural traditions, or indulging in
an easy relativism that does not take difference seriously, but the recognition,
contrary to Habermas, that some differences among social actors amount to
conflicting or incompatible claims. Calhoun acknowledges that relativism of
some sort is a necessary starting point in the project of taking difference
seriously, but that it is not a satisfactory endpoint. The very scientistic attempt to
separate empirical theory from normative theory, as in the case of Weber, "has
contributed to normative theory's problematic over-commitment to a culturally
insensitive Enlightenment universalism" (Ibid. 73). This Western ethnocentrism
is often couched in the language of liberal individualism, that human beings are
essentially interchangeable individuals, and that the similarities of individuals is
more important than the apparent cultural and other differences among them.
Calhoun states that "there are even cases where extreme relativism and strong
universalism actually meet in shared individualism", and that "in this sense, both
that branch of modernity which has lately travelled under the name of
postmodernism and the explicit Enlightenment modernism proclaimed for
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example by Habermas, suffer from weaknesses of cross-cultural sensibility"
(Ibid. 73). Calhoun's contention is that postmodernism is apt to make cultural
difference an insurmountable barrier to both general discourse and normative
critique, whereas Habermas' line of thinking leads to cultural difference being
reduced to mere positions in a developmental scheme, or to not being granted
any theoretical significance whatsoever.
Calhoun further contends that universalist thought tends towards a position
where there can be only one set of fundamental values and that for "Habermas,
famously, these are held to be implicit in the validity claims of all speech" (Ibid.
74). Habermas thus claims an empirical basis for his normative theory, but "the
relevant catch comes with his decontextualized treatment of the giving of
reasons" (Ibid. 74). One of the implications of taking difference seriously is that
theory "must be contentful, not purely and exclusively formal" (Ibid. 76). The
point is that understanding cultural difference is not a mere act of translation, but
a process in which the researcher and informant engage each other in a process
of gradually improving understanding through dialogue, and where each is
changed by it. Understanding is achieved because they, researcher and
informant, gradually change into people who can understand each other. Says
Calhoun, "Since knowing is an activity constitutive of the person, not a
mechanical storing up of data, gaining in knowledge always means changing
somewhat" (Ibid. 82). The implications of this are that though Habermas
conceives human beings intersubjectively, he is criticised for not considering that
the best judgement might begin with relationships rather than decontextualized
individuals. Under the best of circumstances communication does not take place
in an 'ideal speech situation', and as Derrida has stressed, "language itself
produces and makes inevitable the potential for infinitely ramifying interpretations
and plays of difference" (Ibid. 87). Consequently a theory claiming objective
clarity and certainty can do so only by presupposing a foundation in the habitus
and culture of the practitioner, by presupposing tacit assumptions - ''that which
can be left unsaid"(lbid. 88). Calhoun suggests that the answer to this lies in
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increasingly grounding theories in the self-reflexivity of theorists, "in cultural
sensitivity and historical specificity, not in suggesting that because theoretical
discourse cannot live up to its own ideals we must forfeit those ideals as
regulative constructs" (Ibid. 88).
On this view theory must be a 'polyphonic' discourse, not a monological
statement. Ethnographic accounts become dialogical or 'polyphonic' texts that
permit those being represented to speak in their own voices, tell their own
stories, and challenge the ethnographers' views. The reflexive researcher no
longer conceals the complex, situated, ambiguous, and conflictual interactions
behind the smooth objectivity of a realist description. The objectivity of the
researcher's account cannot be warranted independently of the people who are
being researched. As stated by McCarthy, in defence of Habermas, "such
representations are in principle contestable by the subjects whose beliefs and
practices are in question. This is one of the features of subject/subject epistemic
relations that distinguish them from epistemic relations between subjects and
objects-pure-and-simple" (Hoy and McCarthy, 1994: 87). The contention is that
the one-way descriptions of classical realism implied that the subjects were
disqualified as competent partners in dialogue in the very act of representing
them. In McCarthy's words, "assymetrics of representation thus enacted and
reproduced assymetrics of power" (Ibid. 88). The solution is thus practical, and in
line with Habermas, demands reciprocal understanding and symmetrical
discussion of differences to overcome the partial nature of differences, and
hence, the partial nature of objectivity.
Whatever the merits of subject/subject epistemic relations as a normative ideal,
this is obviously not the situation in the world today. The contemporary world is
hierarchically structured along lines of race, class, gender and ethnicity, amongst
others, and interpersonal and intercultural encounters are infused with potentially
distorting inequalities of power. In a situation of structural inequality assymetrics
of power cannot be resolved solely by new methods of representation, and
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raises questions regarding the practical aims and political nature of social
sciences research.
The political dimension of social sciences research
In two separate chapters, one on values and objectivity in the social sciences,
and the other on participatory research as a new paradigm, Johann Mouton
investigates the implications of a politics of truth, and how this "refers to the fact
that social science is per definition value laden" (Mouton & Joubert (eds.), 1990:
39-54), (Mouton in Coetzee (ed.), 1989: 387-403). Being value-laden, and
therefore political, truth is enmeshed in power play, and varies according to the
theoretical strategies employed in the social sciences. States Mouton, "truth is
not revealed, but is constructed by and through the process of practising
science" (Ibid. 39). Contrary to the traditional notion of objective research, that
is, the "naturalistic" notion of objectivity which originated in the natural sciences
during the seventeenth and eighteenth century, Mouton argues that power is "in
fact an intrinsic dimension of all social sciences research" (Ibid. 43). This
contention is based on the premises that, unlike theories in the natural sciences,
social theories are themselves social practices and "constitute an integral part of
the social practices that are studied" (Ibid. 43). Social theorising is reflexive,
interacts with the reality being studied, and is thus "influenced by other existing
practices" (Ibid. 44). It does not leave the people whom it investigates
unaffected, and the question is therefore not whether social sciences have the
ability to bring about social change, or "whether the social sciences have an
interest in power, but what is the nature and content of this interest in power"
(Ibid. 45).
Mouton identifies three dominant epistemological traditions in the twentieth
century philosophy of social science, namely; positivism, the enlightenment ideal
of rationality, and critical theory. Each of these epistemological traditions
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employs their own metaphor of power and emphasises a different methodology.
In the case of positivism an interest in power is expressed in the therapeutic
ideal of healing society, which is conceived as analogous to an organism, of its
evils and diseases. Effective treatment is based on the accuracy of the
diagnosis and hence this theoretical strategy is closely linked to a quantitative
methodology in social sciences research.
In the case of the enlightenment ideal of rationality the interest in power is
expressed in the power of reason. Unlike the organic metaphor employed in the
case of positivism, the human mind or consciousness "forms the basis for the
presumed analogy between the study of human beings and the study of society"
(Mouton in Coetzee, 1989: 393). Man is conceived as "a conscious, self-
directing, rational human being and not a biological organism" (Ibid. 393). The
aim of the social sciences is consequently primarily directed at understanding, to
produce knowledge which will free people of ignorance, superstition and
prejudice, and hence closely aligned to the ideals of the Enlightenment. This
theoretical strategy, which embraces the phenomenological ideal of
understanding, is associated with an anti-positivist epistemology and
methodology, and is closely linked to a qualitative methodology in social
sciences research.
Lastly, in the case of critical theory, an interest in power is expressed in a
concern for the ideological distortions which affect people through either "the
process of self-deception (individual) or because of false consciousness
(society)" (Ibid. 397). The central assumption of this theoretical strategy "is that
man is essentially in a state of alienation" (Mouton & Joubert, 1990: 49). Hence
political power is seen as the ultimate goal, in order to transform the conditions
that constitute people's alienation and oppression, the core concept being the
idea of transformation. This theoretical strategy embraces both the positivist
ideal of causal theories based on objective (quantitative) observation, and
interpretative descriptions based on intersubjective (qualitative) understanding.
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As stated by Mouton, "Theories are therefore deemed to be successful to the
degree that they help social actors to overcome their alienation. The ultimate
epistemological criterion is therefore pragmatic" (Kotze, 1989: 397). This interest
in the humanisation and emancipation of the research subject is associated with
the methodology of participatory research and an emphasis on dialogue.
Each of these theoretical strategies, or paradigms, is thus seen to be aligned to a
particular metaphor of power that is, in turn, associated with a particular research
methodology. This raises the question of which paradigm one is meant to follow
and which is most correct. Mouton argues that "the only answer to these
questions is that the deciding factor will be the nature of the phenomenon being
studied and the way in which the research problem is formulated" (Ibid. 403).
Mouton's approach is thus contextual and pragmatic, and points to the type of
approach proposed by Habermas. Mouton's model corresponds to that of
Habermas in many respects. Habermas too conceded that human interests
structure knowledge, yet did not think of interests in relativistic terms, and
asserted the existence of three universal interests that produce three general
forms of knowledge, which correspond to Mouton's three paradigms.
More importantly, in the context of Mouton's argument, is the question whether
one can still argue that social research can be objective if it is conceived as
intrinsically political and value-laden. In answer to this Mouton states that "the
ideal of objectivity and the notion of the political dimension of social science are
in fact compatible" (Mouton & Joubert, 1990: 49). Mouton proposes that the
solution to this dilemma lies in how one defines objectivity, and that objectivity
should not be seen as a characteristic of the researcher but as a characteristic of
the research process and methodology followed, and revolves around the
question of whether this methodology meets the criteria of validity. Contrary to a
social constructionist argument, it is not because we agree that we hold a claim
to be valid, rather, we agree because we have grounds for granting its validity.
In similar vein to Habermas, our agreements concerning validity claims are made
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on the basis of reasons that are open to intersubjective assessment. As stated
by Thomas McCarthy, "this is a side of social interaction to which post-
Nietzsheans who treat social relations as so many expressions of the will to
power are peculiarly blind: the 'will' to non-violent, consensual co-operation" (Hoy
& McCarthy, 1994: 39).
Habermas' theory of communicative rationality focuses on the pragmatic
presuppositions of mutual understanding, and in my view is one of the most
fruitful attempts to steer a course between the extremes of positivism and
relativism. This does not, however, imply that Habermas' theory is not open to
criticism. In this regard it is useful to introduce the criticisms of Brian Fay, who
writes, "the form of the mistake in Habermas' argument is the unstated
assumption that to understand a speech act is to agree with it" (Fay, 1987: 188).
Fay's argument is that there need not be agreement about the validity claims of
any particular speech act in order to understand it, and that it is possible to think
that people are justified in making the claims they do without at the same time
agreeing that the claims are true. Hence Habermas is seen to move too easily
from talk of justification to talk of agreement, or as stated by Fay, "to equate
rational warrant with agreement is to beg the question which is at issue" (Ibid.
189). One need not, of course, agree with all aspects of Habermas' theories to
concede that legitimate scientific practice cannot also be politically engaged. A
social science can be at once scientific, practical, and critical. As stated by
Seidman, "Habermas' intent should not be obscured in the detail of his theory of
communicative action. He wished to provide a defence of critical theory as a
form of reason, not ideology" (Seidman, 1994: 178). The commitment of critical
theory to social justice is in this view not a culture-specific value, but a reflection
of the orientation to rational consensus that one finds in everyday life. It is on the
grounds of this assumption, that reason is an integral part of everyday life, that
Habermas claimed a rational basis for critical theory (Ibid. 176-179).
Habermas criticises postmodernists for having hidden normative sentiments
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which are concealed from the reader, and which prevent them from developing a
self-conscious praxis aimed at overcoming the problems they find in the world.
In contrast, Habermas' normative sentiments of free and open communication
make the source of his critiques of society clear, while also providing the base for
political praxis. More importantly, for the purposes of this thesis, Habermas
accuses postmodernists of ignoring everyday life and practices, which are
central to his idea of communicative rationality, which is in turn grounded in the
rational potential that exists in everyday life (Ritzer, 1996: 586-591).
In most practical contexts some idea of being 'true to the facts' will be of decisive
importance in assessing the validity of claims. Says McCarthy, "the stark
opposition between knowledge and interest, which traditionally meant ignoring
the latter the better to pursue the former and recently seems to mean the
converse, also has to be superseded by critical theory" (Ibid. 223). As pointed
out by Mouton, critical theory is not unique in its pursuit of interests, and hence
critical theory is no more utopian than other theoretical strategies. Such interests
are not meant to replace critical inquiry, but to inform them. Whether individuals
and societies are committed to the idea of uncoerced agreements, arrived at in
free and equal exchanges, by considering reasons pro and con, makes an
enormous difference. As stated by McCarthy, "critical theory could do worse
than retaining that practical faith and the utopian impulse that animates it" (Ibid.
224).
towards a social science with pragmatic intent
In the case of Foucault, and postmodern theory generally, an interpretation can
only illuminate our understanding of a given phenomenon at the cost of shading
over or leaving out, and social reality is more complex than any single
interpretation can possibly be. Thomas McCarthy, in a comparative analysis of
Foucault and Habermas, concedes that this depiction of interpretation is true, but
94
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
argues that if one adds the regulative constraints of consistency and coherence,
"then the space for an irreducible plurality of equally good interpretations
considerably narrows" (Hoy & McCarthy, 1994: 238-245). McCarthy's argument
is that an interpretation not only has to comply with the agreed upon facts and
the accepted methods of determining them, but will also
"have to be internally consistent and cohere with everything else
we think we know about the domain under consideration, or it will
have to defend its failure to do so by challenging elements
(including purported facts) of the established consensus"
(Ibid. 241).
Hence conflict of interpretations in the social sciences is carried out under
constraints, and make possible a debate on the best interpretation of a given
phenomenon. That such a debate frequently fails to end in consensus is not
problematic for McCarthy, who stresses the pragmatic importance that discourse
need not lead to rational agreement, but that it should be carried out as if rational
agreement about the best interpretation is possible. If this approach is followed
says McCarthy, "the pluralism that then remains is not that of self-encapsulated,
incommensurable points of view, but of different voices in an ongoing discursive
consideration of the reasons for and against competing views" (Ibid. 242).
McCarthy further rejects the suggestion that the claim to a right or better view
necessarily reveals intolerance, ethnocentrism, and disrespect. He contends
that all parties enter a discussion thinking that they have good reasons for
holding the beliefs they do, and respect for opposing views does not imply
granting that they are as good as one's own prior to any discussion. Respect
entails openness to listen, weighing the grounds on which views are held, and
being open to the possibility that they may prove to be superior to owns own.
McCarthy concedes that there is every reason to expect the conflict of
interpretations to be a permanent feature of human studies, but that the
consequences of this need not lead us in the direction taken by Foucault and
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postmodernist theory. Interpretations can be assessed in accordance with
criteria of truth, consistency, and coherence as compared to other bodies of
knowledge and interpretation, and this conflict then takes the form of "critical-
reflective discourse". McCarthy argues that whereas dialogue is set "in
opposition to the regulative ideas of universality and consensus; in reality, those
ideas are often its driving force" (Ibid. 244). Persuading others of the validity of
one's claims is often the reason why dialogue in the form of discourse exists.
Says McCarthy, "we have to see the vindication of universal validity claims
through the reasoned agreement of a universal audience as something that is
always only ongoingly accomplished in ever-changing circumstances, and for all
practical purposes" (Ibid. 244).
The core criteria are therefore pragmatic. It is not possible to separate the
evaluation of any theory or research from the range of possible alternatives to it.
As stated by Craig Calhoun, "choices are made with regard to epistemic gain,
not absolute truth" (Calhoun, 1995: 87). Because theoretical communication
takes place within constraints, it can rise above the ordinary problems of
communication. This is not only a claim to greater clarity and precision, but "in
Habermas' terms to offer readier redemption of validity claims" (Ibid. 87). Hence
Calhoun contends, contrary to PeterWinch and the postmodernists who followed
in his wake, that theoretical discourses enable communication across lines of
cultural difference, "because even where theory does no thematise reflexivity it
nonetheless involves it" (Ibid. 87).
General theory in the Postpositivist Mode
In an essay entitled "General Theory in the Postpositivist Mode: The
Epistemological Dilemma and the search for Present Reason", Jeffrey Alexander
(see Seidman & Wagner, 1992: 322-368) argues that the choice between
scientific theory and anti-theoretical relativism is both a false and dangerous
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dichotomy. The notion that the only alternative to positivist theory is resigned
relativism gives rise to a false
"epistemological dilemma", the notion that "either knowledge of the
world is unrelated to the social position and intellectual interests of
the knower, in which case general theory and universal knowledge
are viable, or knowledge is affected by its relation to the knower, in
which case relativistic and particularistic knowledge can be the only
result" (Ibid. 323).
Alexander states that the social and historical character of theoretical knowledge
"does not negate the possibility for developing either generalised categories or
increasingly disciplined, impersonal, and critical modes of analysis"(lbid. 323).
The argument which Alexander presents is that we are bound to standards that
are rooted within groups and social institutions, that traditions "have a
distinctively rational, impersonal bent" (Ibid. 323). Part of these standards and
the cultural history that produced them, is that actors understand that the world
does not revolve around them, and that this understanding makes impersonal
study of the world possible. Alexander states that "acknowledging
representational subjectivity does not mean abandoning the possibility of
differentiating our representations from objects in the outside world. The
possibility for so comparing 'objective' and 'subjective' is produced by the
development of human culture itself' (Ibid. 343). The ability to differentiate
between our theoretical frameworks and reality is "the first criterion of whether
universality, and some conditional conception of objectivity, can be achieved"
(Ibid. 349). This criterion, in Alexander's view, has been met by both natural and
social science, and "is inscribed in, and sustained by, practical prohibitions
against contaminating empirical data", so that "empirical variations can be
compared with the experimenter's personal expectations" (Ibid. 350).
In other words, by adhering to scientifically sound methods, we can test our
preconceptions against the empirical data, and this is part of the very practice of
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science. These methods make it possible for individuals to "share conceptions
of their impersonal worlds", and "the more individual practice can be subject to
extra-personal control, the more it submits itself to universal criteria of
evaluation" (Ibid. 350). It is this possibility of reaching consensus, that makes
shared ground possible, and "the more neutral this ground not only seems but is
in fact" (Ibid. 350). The criteria of objectivity can be met to the extent that social
science succeeds in developing the conditions for consensus, which Alexander
suggests, is a part of everyday communication. "Because experience is
personal, mutual understanding becomes problematic and hence of ultimate
importance" (Ibid. 352). It is because we are always striving to understand
others and not only ourselves that we "strive for common knowledge" and
"construct categories" (Ibid. 352). What we have in common makes it possible
for us to distinguish between the particular and the general, and hence,
"universal, depersonalised norms are possible - in life as well as in method"
(Ibid. 353). To the extent that we are open and willing to listen to others we have
a choice of mutual understanding, and this understanding includes
"acknowledging the decentredness of human reality and accepting some at least
of its impersonal claims" (Ibid. 354). Like Habermas, Alexander is rooting the
possibility of mutual understanding and social science in the rational potential of
open and self-critical communication, hence "interpretative understanding is not
simply personal and empathic; it necessarily involves an impersonal reference
that allows a critical and universalistic response" (Ibid. 355).
Concluding remarks
"Philosophy of science without history of science is empty; history of science
without philosophy of science is blind" (Gordon, 1991: 589). To which the
sociology of science might well add that an understanding of science must entail
recognition of the cultural and political embeddedness of scientific practice.
These matters have received a great deal of attention during the past century,
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yet has settled few of the epistemic problems of social or natural science. While
scientists claim to be making ever rapid progress, social theorists and
philosophers have raised doubts about the basic foundations of their knowledge
and practice, doubt which has been largely disregarded by practising scientists,
but cannot be ignored if the blindnesswhich Kant spoke of is to be avoided.
With the fall of positivism it has, however, become widely accepted, though not
uncontested, that all observations are 'theory-laden', with the effect that we
cannot rely on information supplied by sense-data. In his comprehensive study
of the history and philosophy of social science, Scott Gordon addresses this
issue, and argues "that the word 'theory' in the phrase 'theory-laden' is used
imprecisely, failing to differentiate between a number of quite different controls
that may impose themselves on factual observations" (Ibid. 605). Gordon
identifies five distinct contentions that have been advanced in relation to the
'theory-Iadeness' of observations (Ibid. 604-607).
The first is that observations are concept-laden, that is, that we make use of
concepts to order the sensations that we receive. Gordon proceeds by drawing
a distinction between the concepts used in a theory and the theory itself. In his
view "concepts are like nouns in a sentence; they assert nothing in themselves"
(Ibid. 605). Though conceding the obvious claim that observations are concept-
laden, he refutes the claim that this should lead to the conclusion that theories
cannot be subjected to and evaluated by the use of empirical evidence. As
previously argued, in the language of 'discourse', concepts are not this innocent,
yet difference is not so absolute as to exclude commonalties in use. It is
precisely these shared meanings in everyday practical usage that makes
communication and shared observation possible. Truth is therefore defined, not
as direct correspondence to reality, but as the result of a process of agreement
by a community of investigators and based on explanatory and practical
success.
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The second contention, that observations are hypothesis-laden, is the claim that
observations are so controlled by the hypothesis itself that contradictory
observations are not possible. This is, according to Gordon, simply bad science.
It does not pose a fundamental epistemic difficulty, rather, it is a practical
problem of honesty in scientific work, of not manipulating data to support a
theoretical hypothesis.
The third contention is that observations are value-laden, that ideological, moral,
and aesthetic values contaminate the empirical process. Gordon concedes the
incontrovertible fact that values may and do "contaminate" the observation of
empirical data, but denies that this poses "an insurmountable epistemic
difficulty", for though all scientific work has social policy implications, especially
that of the social sciences, it is not so deeply embedded in the methodology of
scientific investigation as to be insurmountable.
The fourth contention, that observations are interest-laden, is dismissed by
Gordon because it fails the test of self-reference. Proponents of this view, such
as the Edinburgh School, will be seen to expose themselves to the parallel
contention that their observation reflects their interests. Such epistemic tit-for-tat
does, however, not solve the problem. The test of a theory is of course whether
it can serve as a useful foundation for successful empirical research
programmes. As noted by Johann Mouton, a particular research methodolgy is
linked to a particular paradigm or theoretical strategy that is aligned to a
particular metaphor of power. This raises the question of which paradigms one
is meant to follow and which is most correct. As argued previously the answer to
these questions will be determined by the nature of the phenomena being
studied and the manner in which the research problem is formulated. The
approach which is being proposed is thus contextual and pragmatic, that
objectivity is not a characteristic of the researcher, but of the research process
and methodology being followed, and revolves around the question of validity. It
is proposed that it is not because we agree that we hold a claim to be valid, but
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that we seek agreement by critically investigating the grounds for granting its
validity. Our arguments concerning validity claims are ongoingly made on the
basis of reasons that are open to intersubjectiveassessment.
The fifth, and most general contention, is that observations are laden with
culture-specific ontologies. This contention recognises that people are the
product of enculturation, and that cultures differ. Consequently scientific
knowledge is seen as a reflection of the metaphysical beliefs of the smaller part
of humankind. Gordon refutes this claim by citing the example of a rain dance,
which "does not mean that a rain dance does indeed cause rain to fall when it is
performed by believers" (Ibid. 607). The conclusion drawn is that though the
world is perceived differently by different cultures, this does not mean that there
are many worlds. Or, as stated by Jeffrey Alexander (Seidman & Wagner,
1992:343), "acknowledging representational subjectivity does not mean
abandoning the possibility of differentiating our representations from objects in
the outside world". Contrary to Latour's notion of quasi-objects, it is plausible to
postulate a world external from ourselves. This physical world is of course a less
problematic object of study, and cultural embeddedness poses greater difficulties
for the social sciences as part of the culture(s) which are themselves the object
of study. As has been previously suggested, in order to approximate objectivity,
attempts should be made to replicate a particular study. By repeating a
particular investigation in some other context, we can approach research in a
comparative fashion, highlighting similarities and differences in the findings, and
may better understand and transcend the cultural factors that limit objectivity.
Social science can be at once scientific, practical and critical. The commitment
of critical theory to social justice is not a culture-specific value, but a reflection of
the fact that reason is an integral part of everyday life, and that people can and
do draw distinctions between what power is and should be, and between telling
stories and telling the truth.
Gordon concludes that "like the positivists themselves, their critics went too far,
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claiming in effect that if scientific theories cannot be certain they cannot be
objective, and that objectivity must therefore be abandoned, even as an ideal"
(Ibid. 608).
The choice between competing theories rests on their usefulness as instruments
of investigation. As such scientific investigation is an exercise in pragmatics.
The radical critics of scientific practice cite that it is possible to postulate more
than one theory to account for observed phenomena, but, as Gordon contends,
we are not called upon to prove a scientific theory empirically true, but only to
illustrate that it is empirically adequate. To conflate truth and adequacy is to
problematise research beyond usefulness.
The replacement of authority and tradition by reason and empirical observation
as the means to validate knowledge is a central theme of the Enlightenment, and
a central part of the story of modern science. Postmodernist critics point out that
authority and tradition play a greater role than scientists' narratives about
themselves acknowledge. We also know from the sociology of science the
extent to which traditions, paradigms, material scientific cultures, etc. shape the
understanding of scientists with regard to the problems they identify, and the
possible ways to approach these problems. Science has diversified into so
many specialisations that it is no longer possible for a single scientist to know
everything about his or her work on the basis of observation and rational
deduction alone. Much has to be necessarily accepted on the authority of others
and out of tradition. The conventional understanding of science, which places
the experiment on centre stage, ignores this crucial matter of dialogue among
scientists. Consequently the validation of knowledge, in the conventional
understanding of science, is dependent on the procedures of reason and
observation, which are applied by a decontextualised individual scientist. Says
Calhoun, "but wouldn't we grasp better the nature of scientific revolution (and of
the practice, though not the rhetoric, of contemporary science) by focusing on
the nature of the public discourse among scientists by which putative new
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knowledge is subjected to the critical examination of a range of interrogations?"
(lbid.175).
Calhoun, like other critical analysts of science, wants to refocus our attention
away from the individual knower in order to recognise the collective practice by
which knowledge is constituted and modified. Says Calhoun, "one does not
have to stretch Kant too far in a Habermasian direction to see the notion of
universal communicability as an indication that knowledge would only be
complete when all different (but clearly commensurable) standpoints were
included in the conversation of knowledge. Kant explicitly saw taking the
standpoints of others, and ideally of everyone else, as the way to escape the
illusion that arises from the ease of mistaking subjective and private conditions
for objective ones" (Ibid. 175). Calhoun contends that what is however not
clearly recognised, is that this dialogue among scientists must not be
conceptualised as simply an error-correction mechanism or a method for after-
the-fact verification, "but as one of the actual bases for knowledge" (Ibid. 175).
As has been argued previously, science is, however, not just discourse, but also
entails empirical observation and rational deduction. Hence institutional
arrangements and interpersonal relationships are not just sources of bias, but
also sources of common understandings. Contrary to the centrality of the
experiment and its ideal of control, this conception of research is inherently
intersubjective, and recognises that observation constitutes a social relationship
which introduces change into what is observed, and hence challenges the notion
of an objective reality that can be discovered "out there". A further implication of
this intersubjective and dialogical view of science is that taking seriously the
notion of science as conversation does not necessarily imply a rejection of the
role that deductive reason and empirical observation play in knowledge. In this
regard Cahoun states that "the postmodernist 'discovery' of discourse if often
presented as though it proves the notion of truth based on foundational
observation and deduction to be false, rather than as a qualification and
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relativisation of such truth claims" (Ibid. 177). This is to treat conversation as
essentially arbitrary, as more or less interesting, and not as a means toward
practical consensus as a validation of knowledge. In the manner of Peter Winch
years ago, and the epistemic symmetry of the Edinburgh School, postmodernists
treat different standpoints as incommensurable, and ignore a history of concrete
social practices that encourage mutual understanding and even epistemic gain.
Ironically, postmodernists, as the term suggests, can hardly refute epistemic gain
in their own terms. As pointed out by McCarthy, they must surely ascribe to
some notion that we now know "more and better about the historical variability
and cultural diversity of forms of life, about the linguistically mediated character
of thought and action, about the contingency and contextuality of rational
practices, and the like" (Hoy & McCarthy, 1994: 227). Without assuming that we
have learned something in these respects, postmodernist critics would not be
able to make sense of their own critical arguments. Says McCarthy, "Looking at
the trajectory of critical social theory since its appropriation of Max Weber, we
find that its basic direction is quite similar to Foucault's in an important respect: it
aims to understand the ways in which reason and rationality have been socially
constructed, as a means of achieving a critical self-understanding with
implications for practice" (Ibid. 225). The real difference between critical
theorists and postmodernists, in this view, has to do with whether there is at all a
positive side, or an emancipatory dimension, to the story of the enlightenment.
Although postmodernism encourages us to live without an enemy, it stops short
of offering constructive bases for mutual understanding and trust. While
stressing the need to recognise differences and particularisms, it does not grant
the same significance to common interest in concrete practices, or even to
universal rights without which there can be no full respect for difference. Like the
cultural relativists before them, postmodernists grant no integration based on
communication and trust, and ironically encourage the very cultural seperatism
that they see as the inevitable by-product of universal standards. As Donna
Haraway says in her argument against feminist standpoint theory, "it
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incorporates the very presumption that women are all in crucial regards the
same, and that was one of the most damaging products of the essentialist
reasoning predominant since the Enlightenment" (Calhoun, 1995: 180). As
argued previously, we must be careful to avoid the presumption that standpoints,
cultures or discourses are inherently unitary, and be open to the internal critiques
and competing interpretations within a given standpoint or discourse. This
presumption leads to the ironic position in which postmodernists find themselves.
As pointed out by Calhoun,
"postmodernists are often the mirror image of the Enlightenment
universalists they challenge, making of difference - especially
Derrida's différance - an absolute as rigid as unitary identity or
universalism is to their enemies. And if positive, unitary identity is a
form of violence against difference, so absolutized difference is a
form of violence against intersubjectivity, or more specifically, the
human will to bridge the gap between people, traditions, cultures"
(Ibid. 91).
As argued in the section on the work of Scott Gordon, like the positivists
themselves, their critics have gone too far, claiming that if scientific theories
cannot be certain they cannot be objective, and that objectivity must therefore be
abandoned, even as an ideal. We are, however, not called upon to believe that
a scientific theory is empirically true, only that it is empirically adequate. The
choice between theories is dependent on their comparative usefulness as
instruments of investigation, and hence scientific explanation is an exercise in
pragmatics. As pointed out by Mouton, a commitment to a moral vision of social
science does not mean that we have to abandon claims to scientific validity.
That value-judgements may, and typically do, enter into all domains of scientific
inquiry, more especially in the study of social phenomena, does not mean that
the notion of objectivity must be abandoned. Objectivity must be regarded as a
methodological ideal, and not as a characterising property of scientific
knowledge. The important issue is then a pragmatic one, raising the question of
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how the degree of objectivity in scientific work can be improved. This, it has
been argued, can only be pursued intersubjectively as a self-correcting
mechanism within science as a collective endeavour, when scientists are free to
criticise each other, and even to make epistemic gains in the process of
openness and competition. Objectivity then, can only be hampered by forms of
social organisation which constrain free competition and scientific research. As
Horkheimer put it: "That all our thoughts, true and false, depend on conditions
that can change .... in no way affects the validity of science. It is not clear to me
why the fact of Seinsgebundenheit (i.e., of being historically conditioned) should
affect the truth of a judgement - why shouldn't insight be just as seinsgebunden
as error?" (Hoy & McCarthy, 1994: 10). To grant that there are no final truths, is
not to abandon the distinction between truth and error. We make this distinction
according to the available means of knowledge, and test our claims through
experience and practice in the present.
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